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1. Introduction
Incorporating frictions in dynamic macroeconomic models is undoubtedly essential,
both in terms of their theoretical and empirical implications. They are being rou-
tinely used to explain both the observed persistence of macroeconomic time series
and several stylized facts obtained from firm and household level data. However, at
the macroeconomic level, the selection between different types of frictions and the
specification of their corresponding mechanism is a complicated process featuring ar-
bitrary aspects. This arbitrariness implies that different studies may find support for
alternative types of frictions, depending on other assumptions made. For example,
the choice of nominal rigidities might depend on which real rigidities are included
in the model or whether there is variable capital utilization or not1. More impor-
tantly, unless frictions are micro-founded, policy conclusions may become whimsical
as different mechanisms imply different relationships between policy parameters and
economic outcomes.
In this paper we propose a new inferential methodology that is robust to misspecifi-
cation of the mechanism generating frictions in a dynamic stochastic economy. The
approach treats economies with frictions as perturbations of a frictionless economy,
which are not uniquely pinned down, and are consistent with different structural spec-
ifications. From a hypothesis testing point of view, the set of alternatives considered
are no longer arbitrary.
The paper makes several contributions. First, we derive a characterization for the
law of motion of an economy with frictions that imposes identifying restrictions on
the solution of the model. Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2007), CKM hereafter,
identify wedges in the optimality conditions of a frictionless model that produce the
1See the analysis of Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) and their comparison to the results
of Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2000).
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same equilibrium allocations in economies with specific parametric choices for the
frictions. We also take a frictionless model as a benchmark but contrary to CKM we
construct a general representation for the wedge in the decision rules. We illustrate
through examples that the sign of the conditional mean of the decision rule wedge is
typically known, even when the exact mechanism generating the friction is unknown.
We utilize knowledge of the sign of the conditional mean to set-identify the parameters
of the benchmark model.
Moment inequality restrictions have been used to characterize frictions in specific
markets, see for example Luttmer (1996) and Chetty (2012). To our knowledge, we are
the first to characterize such restrictions in dynamic stochastic macroeconomic models
and to show their relationship with the literature on wedges in equilibrium models.
We are also the first to characterize set identification in this class of models. The
econometric theory we develop can accommodate inequality restrictions of general
form.
Due to set identification, many models with frictions are likely to be consistent with
the robust identifying restrictions. Thus, additional data other than macroeconomic
time series can be potentially useful in order to further constrain the set of admissible
models. As a second contribution, our methodology permits the introduction of
additional restrictions. We show how qualitative survey data can be useful for this
purpose, since they provide distributional information which is highly relevant in
models featuring frictions and heterogeneity. More specifically, qualitative survey data
are linked to current and future beliefs of agents in the model. If survey data reflect
subjective conditional expectations, they contain important indications about agents’
actions through the behavioral equations. In the literature2, survey data are typically
2We mainly refer to the treatment of survey data in the most recent "modern" DSGE literature. The
treatment of survey data in Rational Expectations models date back to the work of Pesaran (1987)
and others.
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linked to model based random variables using additional observation equations with
additive measurement error (see e.g. Del Negro and Schorfheide (2013)). However,
this paper follows a different approach as the model is incomplete and there is no
well defined model quantity that can be linked to the data. This is where the law
of motion representation we derive proves useful, as we can link the macroeconomic
distortions to aggregated qualitative surveys through additional moment inequality
restrictions.
Regarding possible applications of the methodology, we show how it contributes to
model selection, where the object of interest is not the set-identified parameter vector
itself, but the implied semi-parametric estimates of frictions. To that end we propose
a novel Wald test that compares the estimates of distortions implied by a candidate
model to the robust set obtained using our method. We also derive large sample
theory for this type of test. Beyond restricting the set of observationally equivalent
distortions, the use of additional data i.e. surveys prevents the test statistic from
degenerating when the data generating process is such that the incomplete model
nests the candidate model.
We apply the methodology to estimate the distortions present in the Spanish economy
due to financial frictions. We estimate a small open economy version of the Smets and
Wouters (2007) model using qualitative survey data collected by the Commission on
the financial constraints of firms and consumers. We contrast the implied estimates
of distortions to macroeconomic aggregates due to these frictions to those identified
using a complete model that incorporates the Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999)
financial accelerator.
We have already referred to how our paper relates to some strands of literature,
namely the literature on wedges and frictions (i.e. Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan
(2007), Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005), Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan
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(2000)) and the literature on including survey data in DSGE models (i.e. Del Negro
and Schorfheide (2013)). We contribute to the literature that deals with partial iden-
tification in structural macroeconomic models (e.g. Lubik and Schorfheide (2004);
Coroneo, Corradi, and Santos Monteiro (2011)) and the literature on applications
of moment inequality models, see Pakes, Porter, Ho, and Ishii (2015) and references
therein. We postpone illustrating more detailed connections to the vast partial iden-
tification literature for later sections, when we deal with estimation and inference
using our methodology.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a motivating ex-
ample of the methodology in a partial equilibrium context, while section 3 presents
the prototype economy which will be used as an experimental lab to illustrate our
methodology. Section 4 examines the distortions present in the decision rules and
their observable aggregate implications. Section 5 provides the formal treatment of
identification without additional information while Section 6 analyzes the case with
additional information, including qualitative survey data. Section 7 discusses infer-
ence issues and provides the test. Section 8 contains the application to Spanish data
and Section 9 concludes and provides avenues for future work. Appendix A contains
proofs and the empirical results. Appendix B (online) contains more examples of
moment inequality restrictions, details on the relation to the model uncertainty liter-
ature and the algorithm to compute frictions, an example on identification using our
method, an illustration of the validity of bootstrap for the proposed test and details
on the survey data used in the application.
Throughout the paper we refer to three different conditional probability measures.
The objective probability measure, Pt, the probability measure determined by the
frictionless model Mf , P
Mf
t p.|, .q, and the subjective probability measure Pt,i where i
identifies agent i and t the timing of the conditioning set. All three are absolutely
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continuous with respect to Lebesgue measure. The corresponding conditional expec-
tation operators are Etp.q, EMft p.|.q and Ei,tp.q. We distinguish between the first and
the second conditional expectation as the model will be correctly specified only if
the econometrician employs the right DGP. Moreover, T denotes the length of both
the aggregate and average survey data, and L the number of agents. We denote by
θ P Θ the parameters of interest with ΘCSα the corresponding 1 ´ α level confidence
set, and by qjp; θq a measurable function. Bold capital letters e.g. Yt denote a vector
of length τ containing tYjujďτ . The operator Ñp signifies convergence in probability
and the operator Ñd convergence in distribution; N p., .q is the Normal distribution
whose cumulative is Φp., .q; ||.|| is the Euclidean norm unless otherwise stated; K
signifies the orthogonal complement and H the empty set. We denote by pΩ,Sy,Pq
the probability triple for the observables to the econometrician, where Sy “ σpY q, is
the sigma-field generated by Y and pΩ,F , tFutě0,Pq the corresponding filtered prob-
ability space. Finally we denote by d and m the Hadamard product and division
respectively.
2. Robustness in Partial Equilibrium
We first motivate our approach by illustrating the special case of observing a single
household receiving a random exogenous endowment yi,t and making consumption-
savings decisions pci,t, si,tq in a partial equilibrium context. As in Zeldes (1989), wealth
wi,t earns a riskless return R and there is a borrowing limit at zero:
max
tci,tu8t“1
E0
8ÿ
t“1
βt
c1´ωi,t ´ 1
1´ ω
s.t. yi,t “ si,t ` ci,t
wi,t`1 “ Rwi,t ` si,t
wi,t`1 ě 0
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The corresponding consumption Euler equation is distorted by the non-negative
Lagrange multiplier on the occasionally binding liquidity constraint, denoted by
λi,t:
U 1pci,t; θq “ βEtp1` rt`1qU 1pci,t`1; θq ` λi,t(1)
Whether the borrowing constraint is binding depends on the household’s expectations
about future income, and therefore on its information set. Consequently, condition (1)
is a conditional moment inequality, and for any conformable variable zi,t that belongs
to the household’s information set, the following unconditional moment inequality
holds:
E rpU 1pci,t; θq ´ βp1` rt`1qU 1pcit`1; θqq b zi,ts ě 0(2)
Given the inequality, there is no unique vector pθ, βq that satisfies it, and we therefore
no longer have point identification. In order to derive explicit identification regions,
we adopt the approximation of Hall (1978), which for CRRA utility and constant
interest rate implies the following law of motion for consumption:
ci,t`1 “ µci,t ` i,t`1 ` λ˜i,t(3)
where λ˜i,t ” ´pU2pci,t`1qq´1λi,t. Since µ may be exceed one if βR ą 1 and vice verca3,
we re-express 3 in terms of consumption growth, ∆ci,t`1 “ µ˜ci,t ` t`1 ` λ˜i,t.
Since the sign of Etλ˜t is still positive, the identified set for µ0 is :
µID,1 :“
ˆ
0, 1` Ezi,t∆ci,t`1
Ezi,tci,t

“ p0, 1` µˆs(4)
As we can readily see from (4), the inherent unobservability of λ˜i,t is the root of
the loss of point identification of µ0. An interesting question is whether additional
3In fact, µ is equal to pβp1` rqq´ u
1pcq
cu2pcq ą 0, and it will be constant for CRRA utility.
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data can be informative about, or even point identify, µ0. The answer in this case is
affirmative.
Suppose that we observe the dichotomous response of the household over time to
a survey question that asks whether the household is (or expects to be) financially
constrained. An honest household will answer positively whenever λi,t ą 0. What
this implies is that the time series of responses tχ˜i,tutďN for χ˜i,t ” 1p1λi,t ą 01q can
be used to estimate Ptpλi,t ą 0q. The conditional probability distribution of ∆ci,t`1,
Ptp∆ci,t`1 ă uq for any u P R is equal to
Ptpi,t`1 ă u´ µ˜ci,tqPtpλi,t “ 0q ` Ptpi,t`1 ă u´ µ˜ci,t ´ λi,tqPtpλi,t ą 0q(5)
For t`1 „ Np0, σ2 q, (5) simplifies further to,
Φ0,σ2 pu´ µ˜ci,tqPtpλi,t “ 0q ` Φ0,σ2 pu´ µ˜ci,t ´ λi,tqPtpλi,t ą 0q(6)
A key observation is that the distortion λi,t is positive only when the state variables
pwi,t, yi,tq lie in a particular area of their domainA which is determined by an unknown
endogenous threshold pwi˚ , yi˚ q. A complete model would pin down, analytically or
numerically this domain. Observing χ˜i,t dispenses us with the need to characterize
A. Once the threshold condition is satisfied, λi,t will be a linear(ized) function of
pwi,t, yi,tq.
Moreover, it is also reasonable to assume that λi,t is a function of the unobserved
exogenous shocks t`1. We can therefore substitute λi,t for λ1ci,t ` λ2i,t`1, in (6),
which yields the following quantile restriction:
Ptp∆ci,t`1 ă uq “ Φ0,σ2 pu´ µ˜ci,tqPtpλi,t “ 0q ` Φ0,σ2 p1`λ2q2pu´ µ˜colsci,tqPtpλi,t ą 0q
ě Φ0,σ2 pu´ µ˜ci,tqPtpλi,t “ 0q ` Φ0,σ2olspu´ µ˜olsci,tqPtpλi,t ą 0q(7)
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where µ˜cols is equivalent to the least squares estimate in the case of borrowing con-
straints with probability one. The inequality is derived for a class of functions
Ptpλi,t ą 0q.
How does this additional inequality refine the identified set in (4)? Denote by µID,2
the set of µ consistent with the unconditional moment inequality constructed using
zt and (7). The simplest way to show the refinement of (4) is to show that there
exists a µ P µID,1 that does not belong to µID,2. For simplicity, let µ˜0 “ 0, which
implies that ∆ci,t`1 “ χ˜i,tpλ1ci,t ` λ2i,t`1q ` p1 ´ χ˜i,tqi,t`1. This is equivalent to
considering an economy in which βp1 ` rq ă 1 and the consumer has very high risk
aversion (ω Ñ 8). In Appendix A we show that using µols as the test point, (7)
is not satisfied for pt “ 1pci,t ă 0q, and therefore µols R µID,2. The upper bound in
µID should thus be lower than µols. In words, as long as the agent has some positive
unconditional probability of not being constrained (here 12), observing her responses
provides additional information.
The identified set for the reduced form, µID “ µID,1XµID,2, is informative in different
ways. First, as already mentioned, given µID, we can recover the implied identified set
for the risk aversion parameter, ωID. As is typical in the empirical macro literature,
pr, βq are not identified from the dynamic properties of the model but rather from
other information, i.e steady states. In the case when βp1 ` rq “ 1, risk aversion
is unidentified, ωID “ R`, as consumption follows a random walk. For βp1 ` rq ‰
1,
ωID :“
"
ω P R` X
„
logpβp1` rqq
log p1` µuIDq ,
logpβp1` rqq
log
`
1` µlID
˘*
This interval has a very intuitive interpretation, and actually reflects restrictions on
preferences implied by the presence of non-diversifiable income risk and observed
behavior. For the sake of illustration let us focus on the identified set implied
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by (4). If βp1 ` rq ă 1, the household is impatient and does not accumulate
wealth indefinitely. Using zi,t “ yi,t, since income and consumption growth are neg-
atively correlated, which is usually the case when liquidity constraints are present4,
ωID,1 “
!
ω P R` : ω ă } logpβp1`rqq}logEyi,tci,t´logpEyi,tci,t´}Eyi,t∆ci,t`1}q
)
. The stronger the negative
correlation, the lower the upper bound on risk aversion, indicating the fact that the
less risk averse household is not accumulating enough wealth to fully insure against
income risk. On the contrary, weak negative correlation permits higher estimates
of risk aversion. Similar to Arellano, Hansen, and Sentana (2012), the degree of
under-identification therefore depends on this correlation, which is itself a function of
pω, β, rq.
Second, the upper and lower bounds for µID can be used to do inference on other
interesting quantities, including the model itself. For example, we can construct set
estimates of distortions in consumption implied by liquidity constraints by plugging-
in the identified set and averaging over the observations. In population, this produces
an identified set for distortions:
Eλi,t P
“
Eci,t`1 ´ µuIDci,t,Eci,t`1 ´ µlIDci,t
‰
(8)
Another key observation is that although we have motivated the sign of Etλi,t by
looking at the exogenous constraint of no borrowing, the sign is robust to different
mechanisms, as long as they prevent the household from smoothing consumption. For
example, a non zero constraint on next period wealth, i.e. wi,t`1 ě b or a constraint
that is endogenous, i.e. wi,t`1 ě bpyi,tq where yi,t is the relevant state variable, lead to
an Euler equation which is distorted in the same direction. Therefore, the identified
set of distortions will be a priori consistent with different mechanisms generating
liquidity constraints.
4Deaton (1991)
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A mechanism will not be rejected as long as it generates distortions that will statisti-
cally belong to the identifed set for Eλt. Moreover, we will see that in general equilib-
rium, survey data will generate additional moment restrictions which can potentially
add information. The identified set is expected to be refined, and this refinement can
potentially provide power to reject alternative models that cannot be rejected using
bound (4).
In the rest of the paper we will gradually characterize the case for general equilib-
rium models and what information aggregated surveys can provide, based on similar
assumptions to those made in the simple example. To do so, we will provide below
the benchmark general equilibrium model.
3. Towards General Equilibrium
In the last section we considered liquidity constraints for a single household in a
partial equilibrium context. In this section, we consider additional types of frictions
by including capital and a representative firm in the economy and set up the general
equilibrium framework. Building up from the previous section, consider a simple Real
Business Cycle (RBC) model, in which dynastic households with Constant Relative
Risk Aversion (CRRA) preferences form expectations about key state variables and
make consumption - savings decisions. We denote by Λtpiq the distribution of agents
at time t, and the corresponding aggregate variables by capital letters i.e. Xt ”´
xi,tdΛtpiq. Households rent capital pki,tq to a representative firm, which is used for
production, and receive a share pηi,tq of profits made by the firm. Profits are simply
the production of output using capital intensive technology with random productivity
pZtKαt q minus the rents paid to all households pRtKtq, that is, pri,t “ ηi,tpZtKαt ´
RtKtq. Household income is therefore yi,t “ Rtki,t ` pri,t. Individual investment
decisions pιi,tq increase the availability of capital for next period, up to a certain level
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of depreciation. The household’s optimization problem is therefore as follows:
max
tci,t,ki,t`1,wi,t`1,ιi,tu81
Ei,0
8ÿ
t“1
βt
c1´ωi,t ´ 1
1´ ω
s.t. wi,t`1 “ Rtwi,t ` yi,t ´ ci,t ´ ιi,t
ki,t`1 “ p1´ δqki,t ` ιi,t
Note that individual expectations Ei,0 are not necessarily formed with respect to the
objective probability measure, nor with respect to the same information set. Denote
by ξt the aggregation residual, and by X˜ the percentage deviations of any aggregate
variable Xt from aggregate steady state xss. Then the system of aggregate linearized5
equilibrium and market clearing conditions are as follows:
´ωC˜t ´ ξC,t ´ βrssE¯tR˜t`1 ` ωE¯tC˜t`1 “ 0
yssY˜t ´ cssC˜t ´ issI˜t “ 0
K˜t`1 ´ p1´ δqK˜t ´ δI˜t “ 0
Y˜t ´ Z˜t ´ αK˜t ´ ξY,t “ 0
R˜t ´ Z˜t ` p1´ αqK˜t ´ ξR,t “ 0
Under approximate linearity, that is, when ξt is negligible 6, we can obtain the ag-
gregate decision rules for Xt, which will depend on predetermined capital k˜i,t and
on aggregate conditional expectations on productivity for some j periods ahead,
E¯tZ˜t`j.
5Note that here we follow the linear approximation to the first order conditions as widely used in
the DSGE literature, while in the last section we followed Hall (1978), where the variables are not
in percentage deviation from steady state. The analysis is nevertheless largely unaffected.
6Absence of frictions is one of the reasons for which approximate linearity holds.
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In the previous section, we focused on the consumption decision of agents by taking
the interest rate as exogenous and fixed, that is Rt “ R. In this section, Rt is endoge-
nous as it is determined by the marginal productivity of capital, and is subject to
aggregate risk. With regard to the aggregate implications of the borrowing constraints
introduced in section 2, the characterization of individual behavior is identical. In
general equilibrium, what needs to be taken into account is the determination of Rt.
We will formally deal with general equilibrium in the next section. Moreover, in this
section the idiosyncratic risk to income is ηi,t while there is also aggregate risk, Zt.
Compared to the last section, the introduction of aggregate risk does not alter the
observable implications on individual consumption behavior. This is for the reason
that although aggregate risk complicates forecasting for households as predicting Rt
requires tracking Λtpiq7, the inequality in (2) is valid irrespective of the presence of
aggregate uncertainty.
In what follows we will analyze the equilibrium law of motion for investment , where
we can introduce additional types of frictions, in particular those that arise from the
production side of the economy. As in the case of consumption, we first analyze the
aggregate investment decision rule in the frictionless case, which should satisfy the
following second order difference equation:
(9) s¯0
α
E¯tI˜t`1 ´
ˆ
1` p1´ αqp1´ s¯0q ` s¯0ω
αω
˙
I˜t ` I˜t´1 “ 1
α
Z˜t
where s¯0 ” Iss,0Yss,0 , the frictionless savings ratio.
A sufficient condition for a saddle point solution for the latter is α ą s¯, that is, the
steady state savings rate should be smaller than the elasticity of output with respect
to capital. Denoting by ρ1,0, ρ2,0 the two roots of the corresponding lag polynomial
and letting ρ2,0 be the unstable root, the aggregate frictionless investment has the
7Krusell and Anthony A. Smith (1998)
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following law of motion:
I˜t “ ρ1,0K˜t ` 1
ρ2,0s¯0
8ÿ
j“1
E¯tρ´j2,0Z˜t`j(10)
Consider now the case in which the true model has no real or nominal frictions and
agents have rational expectations (Pt,i “ Pt,i) where the corresponding information
set is Fi ” pηi,t, ki,t, Ztq. Following the literature, we assume that only a subset of
tFiuiďN is observed by the econometrician, i.e. Ft “ Kt. The decision rule used by
the econometrician can then be rewritten as:
(11) I˜t “ ρ1,0K˜t ` 1
ρ2,0s¯0
8ÿ
j“0
ρ´j2,0EtpZ˜t`j|σpFtqq ` 1ρ2,0s¯0 et
where
et “
8ÿ
j“0
ρ´j2,0
ˆ
EpZ˜t`j|Fi,tqdΛtpiq ´
8ÿ
j“0
ρ´j2,0EpZ˜t`j|Ftq
“
8ÿ
j“0
ρ´j2,0EpZ˜t`j|Z˜t, K˜tq ´
8ÿ
j“0
ρ´j2,0EpZ˜t`j|K˜tq
The second equality holds due to the linearity of conditional expectations and aggre-
gation. Then, for any K˜t´j,jě0-measurable function φp.q, and using the law of total
expectations, the following moment equality holds8:
EK˜t´jet “ 0
The case of interest in this paper is therefore when
´ Ep.|Fi,tqdΛtpiq ‰ EMf p.|Ftq,
whereMf is the frictionless probability model- or the benchmark model in the general
case9. Here the agents and the econometrician not only have different information, but
they also have a different structure of the economy in mind. EMf p.|Xtq is consistent
8Note that we have not used any knowledge for the exogeneity of Z˜t for this result to hold i.e. it
would hold trivially in the case of an exogenous productivity shock.
9To avoid confusion, I use frictionless and benchmark model interchangeably.
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with frictionless behavior and we thus implicitly assume that the frictionless part
of the model is well specified. The mismatch between the agents’ expectations and
the econometrician’s prediction could be due to differences in the models and/or
information sets, which can lead to different decision rules, and these differences do
not vanish on average.
Therefore, denoting aggregate optimal investment in the presence of frictions by I˜con,t,
which is the data generating process, and by It˚ the frictionless investment rule used by
the econometrician, we can represent these differences in terms of the econometrician’s
observables as follows:
I˜con,t “ ρ1,0K˜t ` 1
ρ2,0s¯
8ÿ
j“0
ρ´j2,0EtpZ˜t`j|σpFtqq ` 1ρ2,0s¯et ` λ˜t
λ˜t “ I˜con,t ´ I˚t
or equivalently, as
E
˜
I˜con,t ´ ρ1,0K˜t ´ 1
ρ2,0s¯
8ÿ
j“0
ρ´j2,0Z˜t`j ´ et ´ λ˜t|σpFtq
¸
“ E `λ˜t|σpFtq˘(12)
Similar to the case of consumption with liquidity constraints, real, nominal or infor-
mational frictions therefore generate a “wedge” λ˜t with non zero conditional mean and
therefore a moment inequality. We will consider a general example of constraints in
adjusting capital, which can be rationalized by ad hoc adjustment costs in capital ac-
cumulation, occasionally binding constraints i.e. capital irreversibility and financial
frictions. The specific examples together with an example on non-rational expec-
tations can be found in the Appendix B (online). Below, we present the general
example.
3.0.1. Capital Adjustment Constraints. Assuming full capital depreciation, Wang
and Wen (2012) show that collateral constraints can be represented by an aggregate
15
function ψpιtq of the investment rate, ιt ” ItKt . Note that this representation can
be rationalized with different setups, including those in which there is a distribution
of investment efficiency shocks across firms. Moreover, such setups can be further
microfounded by different mechanisms i.e. financial frictions à la Bernanke, Gertler,
and Gilchrist (1999). Focusing on exogenous collateral constraints, i.e. the borrowing
limit does not depend on the asset value of the collateral10, they imply the following
subsystem of linearized aggregate equilibrium conditions:
K˜t`1 “ ψ1ssI˜t ` p1´ ψ1ssqK˜t(13)
Q˜t “ ´ψ1´1ss ψ2sspI˜t ´ K˜tq(14)
Q˜t “ ωC˜t ´ ωEt ˜Ct`1 `Ψss,1EtR˜t`1 ` EtQ˜t`1 ` pψ1ss ´ 1qEtpI˜t`1 ´ K˜t`1q(15)
where Ψss,1 ” 1` βpψ1ss ´ 1q.
Denoting by Ψss,2 ” ωpψ1sss¯pα´ s¯q` s¯q´ s¯p1´ s¯qψ1´1ss ψ2ss, γ1 ” Ψ´1ss,2pωs¯´ψ1´1ss ψ2sss¯p1´
s¯qq, γ2 ” Ψ´1ss,2ω and γ3 ” Ψ´1ss,2Ψss,1p1´ s¯q the first order condition (9) becomes
γ1EtI˜t`1 ´ p1` γ1 ` p1´ αqγ3qI˜t ` I˜t´1 “ γ2Z˜t(16)
whose solution generalizes to:
I˜con,t “ ρ1pγqK˜t ` 1
ρ2pγqs¯pγqZ˜t `
1
ρ2
et ` λ˜t
For ρipγ0q ” ρi,0, s¯pγ0q ” s¯0, the corresponding distortion due to capital adjustment
constraints is equivalent to
λ˜t “ pρ1pγq ´ ρ1pγ0qq K˜t `
ˆ
1
ρ2pγqs¯pγq ´
1
ρ2pγ0qs¯pγ0q
˙
Z˜t `
ˆ
1
ρ2pγq ´
1
ρ2pγ0q
˙
et
10Endogenous collateral constraints have a different representation than exogenous constraints. Nev-
ertheless, as Wang and Wen (2012) note, endogenous collateral constraints imply a form of aggregate
investment externality which implies insufficient level of investment relative to the case of exogenous
constraints. This simply reinforces the distortions we derive based on exogenous constraints.
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In order to determine the sign of E
`
λ˜t|σpFtq
˘
, it is sufficient to look at the sign of the
coefficient of K˜t. Using a mean value expansion around zero, the conditional mean is
E
`
λ˜t|σpFtq
˘ “ ρ11pγ¯qK˜t where ρ1pγ¯q1 ” ρ1pγ¯q1
p´q
pγ1 ´ γ1,0q
p`q
` ρ11
p`q
pγ¯qpγ3 ´ γ3,0q
p´q
ď 0.
Frictions in capital accumulation therefore generate negative endogenous distortions,
which implies that Eλ˜tK˜t ď 011.
The preceding example dealt with distortions in the decision rules, which directly
affect- and are therefore informative for- the transmission of shocks and welfare.
Moreover, they can be easily linked to additional data. Nevertheless, frictions are
always justified using the first order necessary conditions for agents’ optimal deci-
sions. In the next section, we present the general case together with a representation
result, which proves useful in translating distortions to the first order conditions into
observationally equivalent general equilibrium distortions to decision rules. One can
therefore directly use the latter. Because we work with linearized models, second or
higher order effects will be ignored. However, moment inequalities, would also ap-
pear in nonlinear models. The way we treat frictions does not depend on assumptions
regarding the approximation error.
4. Perturbing the Frictionless Model
The general framework involves a system of expectational equations . Denote by xi,t
the endogenous individual state, by zi,t the exogenous individual state, and by Xt “´
xi,tdΛpiq and Zt “
´
zi,tdΛpiq the corresponding aggregate states. The optimality
11The signs hold uniformly over γ, for any twice differentiable function ψ. This is straightforward
for the derivatives, while for γi´ γi,0, this gives rise to a quadratic inequality in ψ1ss which holds for
all plausible ψ1ss P p0, 1s.
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conditions characterizing the individual decisions are as follows:
Gpθqxi,t “ F pθqEi,t
¨˝¨˝
xi,t`1
Xt`1
‚˛|xi,t, zi,t, Xt, Zt‚˛` Lpθqzi,t(17)
zi,t “ Rpθqzi,t´1 ` i,t
where Epi,tq “ 0. We assume that the coefficients of the behavioural equations
are common across agents. Relaxing this assumption would make the notation more
complicated, but would not change the essence of our argument. We could also specify
equilibrium conditions that involve past endogenous variables but this is unnecessary
as we can always define dummy variables of the form x˜i,t ” xi,t´1 and enlarge the
vector of endogenous variables to include x˜i,t. Aggregating across individuals, the
economy can be characterized by the following system:
GpθqXt “ F pθq
ˆ
Ei,t
¨˝¨˝
xi,t`1
Xt`1
‚˛|xi,t, zi,t, Xt, Zt‚˛dΛtpiq ` LpθqZt(18)
Zt “ RpθqZt´1 ` t(19)
We will refer to the economy with frictions as the triple pHpθq,Λ, Eiq where
Hpθq ” pvecpGpθqT q, vecpF pθqqT , vecpLpθqqT , vecpRpθqqT , vechpΣqT q.
We partition the vector θ into two subsets, pθ1, θ2q where θ2 collects the parameters
characterizing the presence and intensity of frictions. Thus, setting θ2 “ 0, reduces the
model to the frictionless economy and this is without loss of generality. Furthermore,
in an economy with no frictions, prices efficiently aggregate all the information. Thus
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there is no need to distinguish between individual and aggregate information when
predicting aggregate state variables.
For wi,t ” pxi,t, Xi,t, zi,t, Zi,tq, when agents are rational, and the model is linear ( or
linearized) aggregate expectations for pxTi,t`1, XTt`1qT become as follows:
Exi,t`1 “
¨
xi,t`1pipxi,t`1, Xt`1|wi,tqdpxi,t`1, Xt`1qdΛtpiq
“
¨
xi,t`1ppxi,t`1|wi,tqdpxi,t`1qdΛtpiq
“
ˆ
Pi,1xi,tdΛpiq ` P2Xt `
ˆ
Pi,3zi,tdΛtpiq ` P4Zt
EXt`1 “
¨
Xt`1pipxi,t`1, Xt`1|wi,tqdpxi,t`1, Xt`1qdΛtpiq
“
ˆ
Xt`1ppXt`1|Xt, ZtqdpXt`1q
“ P5Xt ` P6Zt ” EpXt`1|Xt, Ztq
where Pj,j“1..6 are the coefficients of the linear projection. By Rational expectations
and since the coefficients pG,F, Lq are common across i, equilibrium consistency re-
quires Pi,1 “ P1, Pi,2 “ P2 and therefore P1 ` P2 “ P5 and P3 ` P4 “ P6. Thus,
as expected, aggregate conditional expectations collapse to EpXt`1|Xt, Ztq, and the
frictionless economy, pHpθ1, 0q,Λ,Eq, can be summarized by the equilibrium condi-
tions:
Gpθ1, 0qXt “ F pθ1, 0qEtpXt`1|Xt, Ztq ` Lpθ1, 0qZt(20)
Zt “ RpθqZt´1 ` t(21)
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Using the decision rule in the expectational system (20) and solving for the undeter-
mined coefficients 12, a Rational Expectations equilibrium for pHpθ1, 0q,Λ,Eq holds
under the following conditions:
. ASSUMPTION-EQ
There exist unique matrices P ˚pθ1, 0q
nxˆnx
, Q˚pθ1, 0q
nxˆnz
satisfying:
pF pθ1, 0qP ˚pθ1, 0q ´G˚pθ1, 0qqP ˚pθ1, 0q “ 0
pRpθqT b F pθ1, 0q ` Iz b p´F pθ1, 0qP ˚pθ1, 0q `G˚pθ1, 0qqqvecpQpθ1, 0qq “ ´vecpLpθ1, 0qq
such that Xt “ P ˚pθ1, 0qXt´1 `Q˚pθ1, 0qZt is a competitive equilibrium.
Since we know the model up to θ2 “ 0, we rearrange the equations of the economy
with frictions into the known and the unknown part of the specification. Adding and
subtracting the first order conditions of the frictionless economy we get that:
Gpθ1, 0qXt “ F pθ1, 0qEtpXt`1|Xtq ` Lpθ1, 0qZt ` µt(22)
µt ” ´pGpθq ´Gpθ1, 0qqXt ` pLpθq ´ Lpθ1, 0qqZt
`pF pθq ´ F pθ1, 0qq
ˆ
Eit
¨˝¨˝
xi,t`1
Xt`1
‚˛|xi,t, Xt‚˛dΛtpiq
`F pθ1, 0qp
ˆ
Eit
¨˝¨˝
xi,t`1
Xt`1
‚˛|xi,t, Xt‚˛dΛtpiq ´ EtpXt`1|Xtqq
This system of equations cannot be solved without knowing µt. Nevertheless, we
characterize the relationship between µt and a set of candidate decision rules that
depend on the endogenous states and some unobserved process, λt. Proposition 1
states sufficient conditions such that decision rules are consistent with µt.
12See for example Marimon and Scott (1998).
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Proposition 1. Given:
(1) The perturbed system of equilibrium conditions (22) where Etµt ě 0
(2) A distorted aggregate decision rule Xt˚ “ Xf,REt `λt where Xf,REt “
´
xREi,t dΛpiq
is the Rational Expectations equilibrium of pHpθ1, 0q,Λ,Eq and
(3) A λt vector process such that λt “ λt´1Γ` νt for some real-valued Γ:
If there exists a non-empty subset of Θ1 that satisfies
EtpF pθ1, 0qΓ´Gpθ1, 0qqλt “ ´Etµt(23)
The following condition is satisfied for almost all subsets of σpYt´1q :
EtpGpθ1, 0qX˚t ´ F pθ1, 0qpθqX˚t`1 ´ Lpθ1, 0qZtq ě 0
Proof. See Appendix 
Proposition 1 states that if for an admissible parameter vector θ1 P Θ1 condition (24)
is true, the decision rule Xt˚ “ Xf,REt ` λt generates the same restrictions as those
implied using the perturbed (by µt) first order equilibrium conditions. We focus
on parameter vectors that yield determinate and stable equilibria in the frictionless
economy, which implies a restriction on the stochastic behavior of λt.
While it is true that in many cases the sign of Etλt can be directly deduced from
the distortions to equilibrium conditions, Proposition 1 can also be useful in practice,
as we can deduce the sign of the distortions to decision rules without solving for the
otherwise unknown expectational system using (23)13. Moreover, Proposition 1 states
conditions under which we can guarantee that the moment inequality restrictions are
13In more complicated cases where knowledge of Γ is strictly required, condition (23) can always be
checked ex post.
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going to be consistent with the rest of the model, and therefore the implied reduced
form.
2. Analytical example for Capital Adjustment constraints
As illustrated in the previous section, distortions arise in the capital accumulation
equation, Tobin’s Q and the Euler equation. Reducing the system to its minimal
representation in terms of capital and investment i.e. Xt ” pI˜t, K˜t`1), we have that:»– 1 γ1,0 ` p1´ αqγ3,0
1 ´1
fifl»– I˜t
K˜t`1
fifl “
»– 1 0
0 0
fifl»– EtI˜t`1
EtK˜t`2
fifl`
»– γ2,0
0
fifl Z˜t`
»– ´µI,t
0
fifl
where the Investment Euler equation has a positive distortion as the marginal cost of
deferring consumption increases. We can then derive pλ˜I,t, λ˜K,t`1q, and consequently
distortions to all other endogenous variables i.e. consumption. Since K˜t`1 “ I˜t,
Γ11 “ Γ22 ă 1. For Ω :“ 1 ´ Γ11 ` γ1,0 ` p1 ´ αqγ3,0, computing EtpF pθ1, 0qΓ ´
Gpθ1, 0qqλ˜t`µ˜tq “ 0 for the reduced system and solving for the equilibrium distortions,
leads to the following result: »– λ˜I,t
λ˜K,t`1
fifl “ ´ 1Ω
»– µ˜I,t
µ˜I,t
fifl
Although trivial, this example illustrates how cross equation restrictions determine
the sign of all distortions, can then be utilized to construct moment inequalities.
It is useful to note that in certain situations one may be interested in characterizing
frictions over time (and not just on average), and therefore we need to obtain a
conditional model that generates λt. This requires imposing more restrictions on
the stochastic behavior of λt. In the supplementary material, we adopt a model
uncertainty approach in the spirit of Hansen and Sargent (2005); Hansen (2013) and
we show that restricting the class of distributions for aggregate shocks is enough to
obtain a unique conditional model for λt. For the rest of this paper we focus on the
identification using a set of unconditional moment restrictions.
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5. Identification And Estimation
In this section we provide a formal treatment of identification in a linear(ized) Dy-
namic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model based on moment inequality
restrictions. First, we illustrate how our statistical representation of a DSGE model
relates to the state space representation that is typically used for estimation. Building
on Komunjer and Ng (2011), we will show necessary and sufficient conditions for par-
tial identification of the model arising from the theoretical moment inequalities. We
also show conditions under which conditionally over-identifying inequalities provide
a more informative (smaller) identified set.
We base the analysis on the innovation representation of the solution to the lin-
ear(ized) DSGE model. This is the natural representation to use when there are
differences in information between economic agents and the econometrician, as it
takes into account that not all the state variables relevant the decision of agents are
observable. We consider the following class of models:
Xˆt`1|t “ Apθq
nXˆnX
Xˆt|t´1 ` Ktpθq
nXˆnX
at
Y ot “ Cpθq
nY ˆnx
Xˆt|t´1 ` at
where Ktpθq is the Kalman gain and at is the one-step ahead forecast error which
could be derived from the corresponding state space representation:
Xt`1 “ Apθq
nXˆnX
Xt ` Bpθq
nXˆnX
t`1
Yt “ Cpθq
nY ˆnX
Xt ` λt “ Cpθq
nY ˆnX
Apθq
nXˆnX
Xt´1 ` Cpθq
nY ˆnX
Bpθq
nXˆnX
t ` λt
“ C˜pθq
nY ˆnX
Xt´1 ` Dpθq
nY ˆnX
t ` λt
where t is the innovation to the shock vector Zt.
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By construction,
at “ λt ` CpθqApθqpXt´1 ´ Xˆt´1|t´1q ` CpθqBpθqt
Therefore, the forecast error is a combination of the true aggregate innovations to
the information sets of the agents, t, the estimation error of the state variable,
Xt´1´Xˆt´1,t´1, and the frictions, λt. Let Npθq ” vecpApθq1, Bpθq1, Cpθq1q, and assume
that Ept|σpFtqq “ 0, and Ept1s|σpFtqq “ 1ps “ tqΣt , where Σt ą 0. Given
Epλt|σpFt´1qq ě 0, we define the following conditional moment restriction:
(24) EpY ot ´ Cpθq
nY ˆnx
Xˆt|t´1|σpFt´1qq ě 0
For any inequality preserving function φp.q of a random vector Yt´1 that belongs to
the information set of the econometrician, the following holds:
EpY ot ´ Cpθq
nY ˆnx
Xˆt|t´1qφpYt´1q “ EVpYt´1qφpYt´1q ě 0
for a random function VpYt´1q P r0,8s.
In order to study identification through estimating equations we need to make as-
sumptions about the local identification of Θ0, given the value of EV(Yt´1)φ(Yt´1).
We resort to sufficient conditions that make the mapping from θ to the solution of
the model regular, and thus assume away population identification problems (see, for
example Canova and Sala (2009)). We assume that Θ belongs to a compact subset
of Rnθ . Since certain parameters are naturally restricted, e.g. discount factors, per-
sistence parameters or fractions of the population, and others cannot take excessively
high or low values, assuming compactness is innocuous. We also need to acknowledge
that due to cross - equation restrictions, which we denote by Lpθq “ 0, the number
of observables used in the estimation need not be equal to the cardinality of Θ, i.e.,
ny ă nθ . Komunjer and Ng (2011) provide the necessary and sufficient conditions
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for local identification of the DSGE model from the auto-covariances of the data. We
reproduce them below, with the minor modification that Assumption LCI-6 holds
for any element of the identified set Θ0.
. ASSUMPTION -LCI (Local Conditional Identification)
(1) Θ is compact and connected
(2) (Stability) For any θ P Θ and for any z P C, detpzInX ´ Apθqq “ 0, implies
|z| ă 1
(3) For any θ P Θ, DpθqΣeDpθq1 is non-singular
(4) For any θ P Θ, (i) The matrix pKpθqApθqKpθq .., ApθqnX´1Kpθqq has full row
rank and pCpθq1Apθq1Cpθq1 .., Apθq1nX´1Cpθq1q1 has full column rank.
(5) For any θ P Θ, the mapping N : θ ÞÑ Npθq is continuously differentiable
(6) Rank of ∆NSpθq 14 is constant in a neighborhood of θ0 P ΘI and is equal to
nθ ` n2x
Lemma 3. Given Vip.q P rVp.q, V¯p.qs, and Assumption LCI, θ is locally conditionally
identified at any θ0 in ΘI from the auto-covariances of Yt.
Proof. See Appendix 
Given the maintained assumptions, we next characterize the identified set implied by
the restrictions using macroeconomic data.
14 For δNSpθ, T q “ pvecpTApθqT´1qT , vecpTKpθqqT , vecpCpθqT´1qT , vechpΣαpθqqT qT ,
∆NSpθ0q “ pBδNSpθ,Inx qBθ , Bδ
NSpθ,Inx qBvecT q|θ“θ0
25
5.0.1. Characterization of the Identified Set using Macroeconomic Data.
As already shown, the identified set is defined by the conditional moment inequalities
in 24,
ΘI ”
!
θ P Θ : EtpY ot ´ CpθqXˆt|t´1|σpFt´1qq ě 0
)
In all of the identification results we assume the existence of appropriate random
variables to construct unconditional moment restrictions from the conditional mo-
ment inequalities. Such instruments can be either past data or past state variables
constructed with the Kalman filter. By construction, the latter are uncorrelated with
current information, but they might be noisy. In the case of additional moment con-
ditions, a.k.a supernumerary15, we need to show conditions under which they can
further reduce the identified set, as Θ1I will now satisfy multiple moment inequalities.
Although the work of Bontemps, Magnac, and Maurin (2012) deals with linear mod-
els, we cannot use their results here for several reasons. First, the characterization
of the identified set is done through the support function of ΘI16, which requires the
identified set to be convex17. In our case, since the stability conditions and the cross
equation restrictions introduce on Lpθq and therefore nonlinear restrictions on Θ, the
identified set is not necessarily convex and its geometry is difficult to be known a pri-
ori. Second, we deal with moment conditions of general form and therefore additional
conditions arising from more instruments in an IV setting is just a special case. We
nevertheless also provide an adapted Sargan condition. Third, point identification
cannot in general occur despite the moment inequalities as we deal with typically
continuously distributed random variables.
15We borrow this term from Bontemps, Magnac, and Maurin (2012).
16The support function, which is suppqTΘq,@q P Rnθ , can fully characterize any convex set Θ.
17One can alternatively work with the Aumann expectation of the non-convex random set, which is
always convex. Nevertheless, this requires minimizing the support function of the random set for
any value of θ, which is costly in high dimensional settings like ours (Bontemps and Magnac, 2017).
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Recall that the number of moment conditions we use for estimation depend on the
number of observables. Assumption LCI-6 requires that there has to be enough (or
the right kind) of observables such that a rank condition is satisfied. In our case, the
number of observables used determines the number of first order conditions used for
estimation. The minimum number (r) of observables required such that conditional
identification is achieved ( Lemma 4 is satisfied) maps to the necessary first order
conditions. For example, if we have Y1 and Y2 to estimate the model, and we only
need Y1 to conditionally identify θ, then the nθ ˆ 1 first order conditions arising from
Y1 will be the necessary conditions. The rest of the conditions, i.e. those arising from
Y2 are then supernumerary.
Notice that given the structure of the class of models we consider in this paper, it
is straightforward to find a re-parameterization that restores moment equalities, that
is, for every observable Y ot , DUt : EUtφpYt´1q ” U P R` that satisfies the restriction
EpY ot ´ Cpθq˚Xˆt|t´1qφpYt´1q ´ U “ 0. Then, for U ” pU1, U2..Urq1, the following set
determines the map from UI to ΘI :
pΘI ,UIq :“
#
pθ, uq P pΘ,
ą
r
R`q : EpY ot ´ Cpθq˚Xˆt|t´1qφpYt´1q ´ U “ 0
+
(25)
Proposition 4. ΘI when ny “ r
Given correct specification of Mf , Lemma 4 and optimal instrument φ˚pYt´1q, defi-
nition 25 implies the following:
‚ D! invertible mapping G : ΘI “ G´1pUq XΘ
‚ ΘI is sharp
Proof. See Appendix 
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Note that the proposition applies to the infeasible case of using optimal instruments.
If the case of non-optimal but valid instruments, the set is again as sharp as possible,
up to the information loss implied by the non-optimality of the instrument18. It is also
important to note that our characterization is based on the fact that the unobserved
endogenous variables are integrated out using the Kalman filter. This implies that the
only unobservables we need to deal with in the characterization of ΘI is the aggregate
shocks in the economy. Moreover, the set is robust to individual heterogeneity as long
as it vanishes on aggregate. More importantly, given correct specification, U is non
zero if and only if there is a positive mass of agents that indeed face frictions.
Having established the determination of ΘI using the minimum number of observ-
ables, we turn to the case of using a larger number of observables, including non-
macroeconomic variables. Let mα,tpθq and mβ,tpθq denote the necessary and super-
numerary moment functions for identifying Θ, where Epmα,tpθq|Yt´1q “ VαpYt´1q P
rVαpYt´1q, V¯αpYt´1qq and Epmβ,tpθq|Yt´1q “ VβpYt´1q P rVβpYt´1q, V¯βpYt´1qq. For
notational brevity, we drop the dependence on Yt´1 hereafter.
Comparing these general bounds to the ones implied by the model equilibrium re-
strictions, Vα “ Vβ “ 0 and V¯α “ V¯β “ 8. Due to the boundedness of Θ and
the cross-equation and stability restrictions, the effective lower and upper bounds are
likely to lie strictly within r0,8q for every moment condition. Let φp.q be any Yt´1´
measurable function for which mˆα,tpθq :“ mα,tpθqφt and mˆβ,tpθq :“ mβ,tpθqφt, mˆαpθq
and mˆβpθq the corresponding vectors, and m¯αpθq and m¯βpθq the vector means.
Let W be a real valued, possibly random weighting matrix, diagonal in pWα,Wβq.
Furthermore, denote by Qα the conditional expectation operator when conditioning
on W
1
2T
α mˆαpθq and by QKα the residual.
18Recent work in the literature proposes constructing instrument functions to avoid this information
loss, see for example Andrews and Shi (2013). We nevertheless do not pursue this in this paper.
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The following proposition specifies the additional restrictions that need to be satisfied
by the additional moment conditions such that the size of the identified set becomes
smaller. This is a general result, and it applies both to conventional cases where
nY ą r or when data on non-macroeconomic variables is used.
Proposition 5. The Identified Set with Multiple Conditions Given
(1) ΘI ‰ H
(2) Ut P rU, U¯ s, with U ” pW
1
2T
α Vα `W
1
2T
β Vβqφt, U¯ ” pW
1
2T
α V¯αt `W
1
2T
β V¯βqφt
Then Θ1I Ă ΘI iff
(26) EQKα
´
W
1
2T
β mˆβ,tpθq ´ Uˆt
¯
“ 0
Proof. See the Appendix 
The main argument behind Proposition 5 is the following. Suppose that the necessary
moment conditions have no common information with the supernumerary conditions
and that W “ Inα`nβ . From the minimization of E12pm¯ ´ U¯tqT pm¯pθq ´ U¯tq where
m¯pθq ” pm¯αpθq, m¯βpθqqT , the first order condition is
Epm¯αpθq ` m¯βpθq ´ U¯tq “ 0
which for U¯α ” QKαUt can be rewritten as Eppm¯αpθq ´ U¯αq ` pm¯βpθq ´ U¯Kα qq “ 0. By
construction the two parts of the left hand side of the expression are independent,
and therefore both have to be zero.
Epm¯αpθq ´ U¯αq “ 0(27)
Epm¯βpθq ´ U¯Kα q “ 0(28)
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Notice that, by construction, the set of necessary moment conditions in 5.3. must
have full rank, and this establishes a one-to-one mapping from Θ to the domain of
variation of Ut, rUpYt´1q, U¯pYt´1qs. Thus, there exists an inverse operator Gα such
that θ “ GαpUt,Pq. Plugging this expression for θ in 5.4, we get that
Em¯βpGαpUt,Pqq “ EU¯Kα
This is a restriction on the values that Ut can take in addition to the ones implied by
the necessary conditions. A restriction on Ut implies a restriction on the admissible
ΘI given the one-to-one relationship in 5.3. Notice that when the supernumerary con-
ditions do not add any additional information, i.e. mα,tpθq ” mβ,tpθq, the restriction
collapses to Qα “ QKα “ 12 . Given these identification results, we can analyze identi-
fication arising from any inequality restriction, and therefore any additional type of
information can be potentially analyzed. Below, we discuss and formally show how
qualitative survey data can provide additional restrictions that are informative about
aggregative models of economies with frictions. Such information constrains further
the stochastic properties of λt, and therefore the size of ΘI .
6. The use of additional information
Additional data can be potentially linked to dynamic equilibrium models by augment-
ing the observation equation with moment restrictions. The latter can be motivated
by the fact that not all data are explicitly modeled using structural equations, but
they can nevertheless be used to sharpen economic and econometric inference, espe-
cially for unobserved processes. An example of such a process is the distortion λt. We
focus on qualitative survey data because, as we illustrate, they contain distributional
information that can be linked to the aggregate model and are informative about λt.
This is especially true for economies with frictions, as the proportion of agents whose
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behavior is distorted is an important statistic. An example of a distributional statistic
that has been routinely used to judge the validity of complete models is the propor-
tion of firms which cannot change prices in New Keynesian models featuring a Calvo
adjustment mechanism. Our focus is on more general information that is contained in
qualitative surveys, and given that we deal with incomplete models, this information
is able to discard a set of economic mechanisms, and not just one. We thus view our
method as a significant generalization of the treatment of microeconomic information
in dynamic equilibrium models.
Qualitative survey data are usually available in the form of aggregate statistics, where
aggregation is performed over categories of answers to particular questions. As in
micro-econometric studies, the categorical variable is a function of a continuous latent
variable. In a structural context, there is a measurable mapping from the categories
of answers to the random variables relevant to the decision of each agent. For ex-
ample, if the question is of the type "How do you expect your financial situation to
change over the next quarter" and the answer is trichotomous, i.e "Better", "Same"
and "Worse", then the answers map to a set of partitions of the end of period as-
sets at`2: at`2 P rat`1 ´ ,8q, at`2 P pat`1 ´ , at`1 ` q and at`2 P p´8, at`1 ´ s.
For this interpretation to hold, we need to assume that agents report their states
or beliefs truthfully. Furthermore, denote by tSi,k,tuiďN the survey sample over a
period of length T, for the ith respondent. Let Ckl be the lth categorical answer to
question k and ξˆi,t,k the respondent’s choice. Given some weights on each category
wl, the available statistics are of the form: Bˆkt “
ř
lďLwl
ř
iďN 1pξˆi,t P Ckq. Given
truth telling, we can map the answer to agent beliefs i.e. there exists a mapping
h : ξˆi,t Ñ ξi,t ” Ei,tpxi,t`1|xi,t, Xtq. Moreover, since the conditional expectation is a
function of the information set, let Bl ” tpxi,t, Xtq P R2nx : hpxi,t, Xtq P Ckl u, that
is, Bl belongs to the partition of the support of individual xi,t (or aggregate Xtq
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that corresponds to category Ckl . Consequently, the survey statistic has the following
theoretical form, which can be linked to the model:
Bˆkt “
ÿ
lďL
wl
ÿ
iďN
wi1pEi,tpxt`1,i|xi,t, Xtq P Blq(29)
For every Y ot with a corresponding model based conditional expectation Y mt ” EpY ot |M,Ftq,
Proposition 6 illustrates the additional restrictions implied by Bˆkt . For these to hold,
we need to make the following assumptions:
. ASSUMPTION -S
(1) Let Bˆkt defined as in (29) and an aggregate shock vector Zt of length p ą 0, with
innovation t|Ft´1 „ p0,Σeq.
(2) λi,t is conditionally linear.
(3) Truthful response such that Bˆkt Ñ Bt P p0, 1s.
(4) Rˆmt :“
ˆ
Epxmi,t´1|xi,tPX ‹,Ct q
Epxmi,t´1|xi,tPX ‹t q ´ 1
˙
Ppxi,t P X ‹,Ct q is monotone in X ‹,Ct for all m “ 1..nx.
The assumption of conditional linearity for λi,t enables us to claim that once the
distortion is activated, it is a linear function of the states and the shocks, e.g.
λi,t :“ λ1xi,t´1 ` λ2zi,t. We motivate assumption S-4 after presenting the following
proposition:
Proposition 6. Under Assumption-S, the following restriction holds, PXt´1 ´ a.s.
EpY ot |Xt´1q ď P pθ1, 0qXt´1 ` λ1Xt´1 d EpBt|Xt´1q
where P pθ1, 0q ” Cpθq.
Proof. See Appendix A 
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Notice that in the proof, we define pX ‹t ,Z‹t q as the time dependent subset of the
support such that λi,t ‰ 0. In models of heterogeneous agents these boundaries
usually depend on aggregate states and shocks. Therefore, this inequality will in
general be strict unless Bt “ 0.
Moreover, in the proof we establish two facts. First, since the equilibrium conditions
of the model with frictions depend on subjective conditional expectations, and the
model with frictions is a smooth perturbation of the frictionless model, any probability
statement on the subjective expectations translates to a probability statement on
µi,t. Second, any probability statement on µi,t is a probability statement on the
solution of the model, and therefore on λi,t. Given representation (29), qualitative
survey data have information on the quantiles of subjective conditional expectations
of the agents. Therefore, survey data relate directly to the conditional probability
of observing a friction, Ptpλi,t ě 0q, which implies the above restrictions. The latter
cannot in general deliver point identification, as the vector Rˆt “ pRˆ1t , Rˆ2t ...Rˆnxt q is
hard to pin down unless specific assumptions are made. Monotonicity, which is a
mild assumption, provides a bound.
Given Proposition 6, we can also establish the following corollary result regarding
identification using survey data.
Corollary 7. Identification with Survey Data
(1) If Bˆkt Ñ Bt P p0, 1q, Θ1I Ă ΘI .
(2) Impossibility of point identification: When Bt ‰ 0, ΘI is not a singleton
Proof. See Appendix 
Corollary 7 has several implications. First, the set of admissible structures becomes
smaller, and we can therefore make more precise statements regarding parameters and
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conditional predictions. Second, using identified set and the definition of λpYt, θq, a
plug-in set estimate of the average distortion (wedge) in a macroeconomic variable Yt
is EλpYt, θIpY qq. These estimates of distortions can be used in several ways, which
we explore in the next section.
7. Inference based on λpΘIq
We first discuss briefly how ΘI and λpΘIq can be obtained in practice. Given the
quasi-structural framework, performing inference for ΘI rather than θ0 seems a natu-
ral thing to do. Many of the parameters in dynamic macroeconomic models are semi-
structural, and therefore θ0 itself does not have a very specific economic interpretation.
We therefore use methods appropriate for constructing consistent estimators for the
identified set (IdS) and confidence sets (CS) for the IdS. In the frequentist literature,
several methods have been proposed for a general criterion function like subsampling
Chernozhukov, Hong, and Tamer (2007); Romano and Shaikh (2010) or the bootstrap
for moment inequality models Bugni (2010). Nevertheless, in macroeconomic models
parameter dimensions are high and pointwise testing is a vastly inefficient way to con-
struct confidence sets, so we focus on computationally tractable methods to perform
statistical inference using Markov Chain Monte Carlo algorithms (MCMC).
When θ0 is point identified and root-n estimable, Chernozhukov and Hong (2003) have
proposed to use simulation methods to do inference on θ using the quasi-posterior
distribution, which is constructed using the relevant loss function Lnpθq that defines
θ0. Generalized Method of Moment (GMM) class of estimators can be easily embed-
ded in this case. Denoting by pipθq the prior distribution, simulation draws tθjujďL
are obtained from
Πnpθ|Yq ” exppTLnpθqq´
Θ exp pTLnpθqqdpipθq
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and upper and lower 100p1 ´ αq{2 quantiles are used to conduct inference that has
valid frequentist properties. Nevertheless, once point identification fails, one has to
consider adjusting the method to accommodate for this.
More particularly, let Lnpθq “ n 12 qnpθq1` Wnn 12 qnpθq` be the criterion function to
be minimized, where qnpθq are the moment functions to be used and qnpθq` ”
maxpqnpθq, 0q “ minp´qnpθq, 0q. If Lnpθq is stochastically equicontinuous, that is,
there exists a ∆npθ0q and Jnpθ0q such that Lnpθq admits a quadratic expansion 19
then this allows us to assume a Central Limit Theorem (CLT) on ∆npθ0q. Redefining
Qnpθq ” qnpθq ´ b where b is the bias term and L˜npθ, bq “ n 12Qnpθq1Wnn 12Qnpθq, we
assume that the following CLT holds
V pθ0, b0q´ 12 ∆˜npθ0, b0q dÑ Np0, Iq(30)
Estimating equations arising in DSGE models involve smooth functions. This is
particularly true if we focus on determinate equilibria, so that model specification
is uniform across the parameter space. Combining them with smooth instrument
functions is enough to guarantee stochastic equicontinuity.
Given 30, Liao and Jiang (2010) show that when using a cutoff rate νn such that 1 ă
νn ă n, and definingAn :“ tmaxϑ lnpΠnpϑ|Yqq ´ lnpΠnpθ|Yqq ď νnu then dHpAn,ΘIq Ñp
0 where dHp., .q is the Hausdorff distance between two sets 20. Moreover, the rate of
convergence of the pseudo-posterior density outside the identified region is exponen-
tial. As is evident, in finite samples the identified will depend on νn, so some ro-
bustness checks are required. In addition, since our criterion function vanishes when
19
Lnpθq “ Lnpθ0q` pθ ´ θ0q1∆npθ0q ´ 12 pθ ´ θ0q
1nJnpθ0qpθ ´ θ0q `Rnpθq
20dHp., .q “ max rsupaPA infbPB ||b´ a||, supbPB infaPA ||a´ b||s
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θ P ΘI , we do not need to adjust νn as suggested in Chernozhukov, Hong, and Tamer
(2007).
With regards to constructing confidence sets for the identified set, which is what
we do in the empirical application, recent work by Chen, Christensen, O’Hara, and
Tamer (2016) provides a computationally attractive procedure to construct CS for
the IdS and functions of it that have correct coverage from a frequentist perspective.
Compared to Chernozhukov and Hong (2003); Liao and Jiang (2010), cutoff values
are based on quantiles of draws of the loss function Lnpθq rather than draws from the
quasi-posterior of the parameter vector and there is no maximization involved. Also,
results extend to models with singularities, that is models in which a local quadratic
approximation involves a non vanishing singular component, and parameters are not
root-n estimable. This is useful in case one wants to derive bounds based on extensions
to non-parametric treatments of the survey based bounds. Although we find the
method suggested very appealing, we apply it only in the case of estimating frictions.
Proving validity for the testing procedure we will propose in this section is not trivial
as it involves combining two independent MCMC chains, and we leave this interesting
research for the immediate future.
We next motivate the proposed test that utilizes λY pΘIq. When a complete model
is estimated, the pseudo true vector θ0 is point identified. Given its value, we can
estimate the predicted level of friction in each of the macroeconomic variable, EλY pθ0q.
Misspecification of this model may imply that the predicted friction does not lie in
the identified set of distortions. Therefore, the distance from EλY pΘIq becomes a
sufficient statistic to judge whether the suggested model is properly specified. We
propose a Wald statistic that tests whether the expected distance from the point
estimate for the wedge from the parametric model to the identified set of wedges is
different than zero for all (or some of) the observables. Since survey data provide
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more information on the wedge, this increases power to reject non-local alternatives.
In addition, survey data regularizes the test, as in the absence of additional data the
distribution degenerates and requires non-standard inference.
7.0.1. A Test for Parametric Models of Frictions. Letting H0 : θp P Θs and
H1 : θp R Θs, the proposed statistic is as follows:
Wt “
˜?
T inf
λsPλpΘˆsq
||V´ 12 pλs ´ λ‹pq||
¸2
where λ is the estimated friction obtained using either the identified point in the
parametric model case, λp, or the identified set in the robust case, λs. Individual
frictions are weighted by their respective estimate of standard deviation. The statistic
measures the Euclidean distance between the wedge that arises in the parametric
model, and the set of admissible wedges, adjusted for estimation uncertainty. Under
the following conditions, the test is consistent and has asymptotic power equal to one
against fixed alternatives.
. ASSUMPTION -R (Regularity conditions) Let D and q be Y´ measurable
functions, continuous in θ w.p.1 and q˜p.; θq ” q˜p.; θq ´ q¯p.; θq such that:
(1) For any Y, and any θ P Θ, ?T q˜pY; θq Ñd N p0,Ωq
(2) supθPΘDnpθq Ñp D where D is positive definite
Proposition 8. Consistency and Power. Under assumption R:
(1) TWpθp,Θsq dÑ ||řj“1..p ωjN p0, Ipq||2
(2) Given critical value cα with α P p0, 1q,
(a) Under H0: lim
TÑ8PpTWpθp,Θsq ď cαq “ 1´ α
(b) Under H1: lim
TÑ8PpTWpθp,Θsq ď cαq “ 0
Proof. See Appendix 
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In the supplemental material we show that using the non-parametric block bootstrap
to compute cα is valid, and we illustrate through a measurement error example that
the bootstrap distribution coincides with the asymptotic distribution. Thorough ex-
amination of the performance of this test in small samples is a very interesting avenue
of research, which deserves separate treatment. Another equally interesting topic for
future research is to investigate which criterion function would deliver robustness of
the testing procedure to possible misspecification of the benchmark model, which we
have assumed away. See Ponomareva and Tamer (2011) for the issue of misspecifica-
tion in moment inequality models.
Finally, we briefly discuss the refutability of the candidate model, in the sense of
Breusch (1986). The Null hypothesis, tests whether the point identifying restrictions
on λY implied by the candidate model are satisfied on λY,s, where the latter is only set
identified. Since pλY,s, λY,pq is constructed using θ1 as identified using the frictionless
and complete model respectively (See Proposition 1 for the definition of θ1), λY,p is
a function of the additional parameters indexing the CM, θ2. In the absence of cross
parameter (equation) restrictions on Θ1 ˆ Θ2, λY,p would necessarily lie within λY,s
as the latter would be consistent with any θ2 P Θ2. However, in the presence of cross
equation restrictions, pθ1, θ2q lie in a strict subset of Θ1ˆΘ2. Thus, the completion λY,p
may not necessarily lie within the family of completions, λY,s. Equivalently, Dλ P λs
that is not observationally equivalent to λp. In this sense, the candidate model is
refutable only when it imposes restrictions on λy :“ Uypθ1, θ2q for any observable Y ,
which implies restrictions on the reduced form. This is indeed true in the context
of incomplete general equilibrium models; taking the unconditional expectation in
condition (23) of Proposition 1, implies that (Θ1,Θ2) is not variation free and therefore
Uypθ1, θ2q is restricted. With additional information, the set on which H0 and H1 are
defined is reduced, and therefore the set of alternatives is narrower.
38
8. Application: Estimating Frictions in the Spanish Economy
We apply the methodology to the case of Spain, where financial frictions have arguably
played a significant role during the last decade. The benchmark economy we use
features some frictions and since it is standard, we will directly introduce the log-
linearized conditions. We consider a small open economy with capital accumulation,
along the lines of Smets and Wouters (2007) and Gali and Monacelli (2005). There
are households, intermediate good firms, final good firms, government expenditure,
and a foreign sector which is composed by infinitesimal symmetric economies.
The type of frictions we allow in the baseline model are those we do not have suffi-
ciently informative survey data to implement our methodology. Thus, we keep the
parametric Calvo type of friction in the wage setting by labor unions and in the price
setting behavior of firms. All other frictions are going to be semi-parametrically char-
acterized. We thus remove capital adjustment costs, and therefore Tobin’s q becomes
constant. This implies that the arbitrage condition between capital and bonds has
no dynamics in the benchmark model.
Let Xo1 denote the vector of variables that enter the moment equalities, Xo2 the vec-
tor of variables used in the moment inequalities and Z the vector of instruments.
Model predictions are denoted with superscript ’m’. The conditions we use are there-
fore:
EppXo1,t ´Xm1,tq b Ztq “ 0
EppXo2,t ´Xm2,tq b Ztq ď 0
The variables employed in estimation are Non Government Consumption expenditure
(C), Hours (H), Inflation (pi), Investment (I), Gross Domestic Product (Y), Wages
(W), and the EONIA rate (R). Real variables are in per capita terms.W use lagged
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values of output and consumption as instruments, as both positively depend on the
capital stock which is unobserved. We estimate the model using two different subsets
of survey data from Spain, collected by the European Commission. Our sample period
covers 1999Q1 to 2013Q4. Detailed information on this survey data can be found
at: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/db_indicators/surveys/index_en.
htm
In the set of survey responses, we include responses to quarterly questions 1,2 and
11 from the Consumer Survey, that relate to the financial position of the household.
We plot the time series in Appendix B. Credit constraints imply negative distor-
tions to household consumption, and given that hours worked are complementary to
consumption, they also imply negative distortions to labor supply and output. In
addition, we use business survey data, in particular questions 8F4 and 8F6, relating
to capital adjustment costs and financial constraints to production capacity. For the
case of capital adjustment costs, we have restrictions on Y and I similar to those of
the general example in Section 3. Financial constraints to productive capacity imply
similar restrictions and lead to lower aggregate investment and output. We therefore
choose Xo1,t ” pW,pi,Rq and Xo2,t ” pY, I,H,Cq. We estimate the model using the
2-block RW-MCMC with uniform priors for all parameters21. Since the survey based
moment restrictions require estimating the nuisance parameters λ1 (see Proposition
6), for a given draw of Θ1, we obtain λˆ1 by ordinary least squares. This approxima-
tion can, in theory, weaken the informativeness of the additional restrictions but we
do not observe this in our results.
8.1. Details of the exercise. We obtain the 95% confidence sets of wedges, that
is, a range for the standardized wedge in each observable that is consistent with
both macroeconomic and survey data, λy ” pEVy|xˆEVxˆq´1EXˆt,t´1pYt´CpΘIqq, which
21We keep the last 200000-300000 draws for inference.
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under linearity is equivalent to pEVy|xˆq´1λy22. These estimates are the empirically
relevant wedges that any model featuring financial frictions and adjustment costs
should produce over the whole sample. We plot them (in red) in the left panel of
Figures 1-6, in Appendix A.
We employ a complete model (CM) featuring Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999)
(BGG) type of frictions (similar to Graeve (2008)) and estimate it using the same
macroeconomic aggregates as the IM using full information MCMC, where we also
rely on Chen, Christensen, O’Hara, and Tamer (2016) to obtain ΘcsCM .
Despite that the model features financial frictions on the firm side (the "entrepreneurial
sector"), and not borrowing constrained consumers, its implications can still be tested
against the incomplete model (IM), which is robust to both types of frictions.
We plot (in blue) the corresponding confidence sets for the wedges that are consistent
with the complete model. To facilitate the comparison, we also produce an alternative
comparison based on QQ plots, which gives information on the support of each of these
estimates. Note that in some of the cases the support is completely different.
In Table 1 (Appendix A), we display the corresponding confidence sets for Θ using
survey data. Confidence sets for ΘIM without using survey data and the correspond-
ing wedges can be found in Appendix B.
A key observation is the fact that the sign of the wedge confidence sets that correspond
to the restrictions imposed to identify the IM are in accordance with the sign of the
distortions identified with the CM. While both the CM and IM identify negative
distortions to output, the former identifies a significantly lower level of distortions.
As is typical, empirical versions of accelerator type of models ignore the output costs
(bankruptcy costs) as they are deemed to be numerically unimportant. Some of
22We actually compute λt using quadratic programming as in the second section of the online
Appendix and then take the average. The result is equivalent to a standardized wedge.
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the neglected variation is indeed captured by the high estimates of φp,CM relative to
φp,IM .
Regarding inflation, using the CM we cannot reject zero frictions to pit, while the
IM identifies significantly negative distortions. Moreover, the CM identifies a much
higher slope of the Phillips curve23, which is consistent with its "inability" to generate
negative distortions to inflation.
With regard to the nominal interest rate, both the CM and the IM identify negative
distortions (with no evidence of different magnitudes). Mechanically, this is due to
the Taylor rule that pins down rt. Nevertheless, there is also a deeper insight which
comes from steady state reasoning. In an economy with uninsured idiosyncratic risk
on both firms and consumers, the steady state interest rate is lower than in the case
of complete markets, and as shown by Angeletos (2007), this does not contradict neg-
ative distortions to capital accumulation due to the presence of a risk premium.
Furthermore, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the CM is consistent with zero
distortions to ct, while the IM identifies negative distortions. Moreover, the estimates
of risk aversion are much lower in the IM compared to the CM. One of the reasons is
the fact that the CM ignores credit constraints to consumers, and therefore requires
much higher estimates in risk aversion to match the corresponding negative distortions
to consumption.
With regard to hours worked, both the IM and the CM identify negative distortions
which are statistically different. Since σc,IM is much smaller than σc,CM , negative
distortions to consumption are consistent with less distortions to hours in the IM.
Moreover, the CM identifies a slightly higher (inverse) Frisch elasticity (σl,CM) and
does not reject zero distortions to wt, while the IM identifies positive distortions.
23κ :“ p1´ιpξpqp1´ξpqp1`βιpqpξpp1`pφc´1qpqq where p (Kimball aggregator) is calibrated to 10.
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The latter observation is not robust to excluding the survey data as shown in Table
2.
Finally, the IM and CM identify the same negative distortions to investment. Since no
marginal Θcs has an extremely narrow support, this result can be possibly explained
by the mapping from parameters to investment that is nearly not injective. This is
not a problem per se, as the MCMC method we have used to obtain confidence sets
in both the IM and the CM is robust to lack of identification.
The non overlapping standardized output, inflation and labour wedges provide enough
evidence to reject the hypothesis that the SW-BGG model implies similar distortions
to those identified by the IM. This finding also corroborates existing evidence of
the lack of uniform fit for such a model over the entire business cycle ( Del Negro,
B. Hasegawa, and Schorfheide (2016) for the case of the US).
9. Conclusion
In this paper we propose a new inferential methodology which is robust to misspeci-
fication of the mechanism generating frictions in dynamic stochastic economies. We
characterize wedges in equilibrium decision rules in a way which is consistent with a
variety of generating mechanisms. We use the implied restrictions to partially identify
the parameters of the benchmark model, and to obtain a set of admissible economic
relationships. Moreover, we formally characterize set identification given the num-
ber of observables. Regarding the latter, beyond macroeconomic data, we show how
qualitative survey data can provide additional distributional information, which is
crucial in economies with ex post heterogeneous and frictions. Survey data provide a
sufficient statistic for this information that would otherwise have to be generated by
a model. We show how to exploit this additional information to test parametrically
specified models of frictions. We apply our methodology to estimate the distortions
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in the Spanish economy due to financial frictions and adjustment costs using an small
open economy version of Smets and Wouters (2007) model and qualitative survey data
collected by the European Commission. We investigate the adequacy of Bernanke,
Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) type of financial frictions.
In general, our work shows that adopting a robust approach to inference and using
the information present in surveys is a fruitful way of dealing with lack of knowledge
about the exact mechanisms generating frictions.
Our work is limited to dynamic linear economies and has focused on deviations of the
representative agent approximation from the underlying heterogeneous agent econ-
omy. Possible extensions could study deviations based on a benchmark heterogeneous
model. Buera and Moll (2015) have recently shown that the distortions generated in
an aggregate equilibrium condition can depend on the type of heterogeneity present
in the economy. Our approach is robust to this criticism. The methodology does
not rest on observing residuals from representative agent frictionless economies - we
just impose moment inequality restrictions theoretically motivated by deviations from
the frictionless economy. In addition, if heterogeneity has additional implications for
the form of these restrictions, they can be taken on board. In addition, we impose
weak moment inequalities. This is important when heterogeneous distortions in de-
cision rules cancel out. Finally, we impose restrictions implied by µt on all of the
variables and thus take general equilibrium effects into account. Nevertheless, future
work could focus on investigating the robustness of our methodology in environments
where some heterogeneity is ignored when imposing the identifying restrictions.
Finally, we have assumed that aggregated survey data are not systematically biased
and strategy proof. Analysing the consequence for inference would be another fruitful
avenue of research.
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10. Appendix A
Proof. of Proposition 1.
Recall the representation for the model with frictions, that is,
Gpθ1, 0qXt “ F pθ1, 0qEtpXt`1|Xtq ` Lpθ1, 0qZt ` µ˜t
Plugging in the candidate distorted decision rule: Xt˚ “ Xf,REt ` λ˜t and using that
F pθ1, 0q
nxˆnx
P ˚pθ1, 0q
nxˆnx
`G˚pθ1, 0q
nxˆnx
“ 0 and pRpθ1, 0qT
nzˆnz
bF pθ1, 0q ` Iz b pF pθ1, 0qP ˚pθ1, 0q `
G˚pθ1, 0qqqvecpQpθ1, 0qq “ ´vecpLpθ1, 0qq we have the following condition:
EtpF pθ1, 0qλt`1 ´Gpθ1, 0qλt ` µ˜tq “ 0
Note that in this proposition we let the econometician’s model variables (observables
Yt and unobservables Zt coincide with a proper subset of Xt and Zt. That is, setting
θ2 “ 0 essentially eliminates some of the elements of pXt, Ztq. Furthermore, in the
proposition we state that λt “ λt´1Γ ` νt for some real-valued Γ ‰ 0. Substituting
for λt we get the condition stated in Proposition 1, that is:
EtpF pθ1, 0qΓ´Gpθ1, 0qqλt ` µtq “ 0(31)
To motivate the assumption on the random variable λt notice that, the condition
above essentially links the conditional mean of λt with that of µt. Since µt is by con-
struction a linear function of Xt, then µt is correlated with subsets of the information
set of the agent, σpFtq. Then, there exists a projection operator P such that for any
element H t P Ft, µt “ PHt `PKHt “ PHt ` vt. Projecting µt`1 on µt:
Ppµt`1|µtq “ PpPHt`1 ` vt`1|PHt ` vtq
“ PpPHt`1 ` vt`1|PHtq `PpPHt`1 ` vt`1|vtq
“ PpHt`1|Htq
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This implies that, there exists a real valued matrix Γ˜ such that µt`1 “ Γ˜µt ` ut`1.
Substituting in the condition 9.1 and collecting all the errors in wt`1 (we can do this
as they are not uniquely defined) we have that:
pF pθ1, 0qΓ´Gpθ1, 0qqλt`1 “ Γ˜pF pθ1, 0qΓ´Gpθ1, 0qqλt ` wt`1
Denoting by C˜ the generalized inverse of C :“ F pθ1, 0qΓ ´ Gpθ1, 0q we have that
λt`1 “ Γ˜λt ` CC˜wt`1. Comparing with the proposed representation for λt we have
that Γ “ Γ˜ and a non uniquely defined νt that nevertheless satisfies Epνtq “ 0
Note: The assumption that the system can be casted in the expectational form to
which we apply the method of undetermined coefficients is with no loss of generality.
More elaborate methods like a canonical or Schur decomposition, can be used to
obtain forward and backward solutions, and the existence of an incomplete rule would
require arguments similar to the non zero determinant stability conditions for Γpθq
and µt. 
Proof. of Lemma 3
Given VipYt´1q, the condition in 5.1 can be rewritten as EpY˜ ot ´CpθqXˆt|t´1qφpYt´1q “
0 where Y˜ ot ” Y ot ´ VpYt´1q. Given LCI, the Proposition 2-NS in Komunjer and Ng
(2011) can be applied. Moreover, local identification holds for generic i, and therefore
holds for any θ0 in ΘI as LCI guarantees a unique map from Vi to θ0. 
Proof. of Proposition 4 (ny “ r)
(1) For every observable Yt we can construct nθ moment conditions. Then, r is
the minimum number of observables such that Jpθq ” BBθΛpθq, is of full column
rank. Thus, for H ” JrˆnθpθqT , Zt P Yt´1 and mpZt, θq ” HbφpZtq, the first
order condition becomes EpmpZt, θq ´ V pZtqφpZtqq “ 0 or more compactly
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EmpZt, θq ” Gpθq “ U
rˆ1 P p´8, U¯ s. Given Lemma 4, Gpθq is well behaved,
and since ny “ r, it is invertible in U , which guarantees a unique solution
θ˚pUq for all admissible U . Thus, ΘI “ ΘX θ˚pUq.
(2) Given that ΘI “ Θ X G´1pUq, sharpness of ΘI is determined by the set of
admissible structures S such that @s P S, F spYt,Yt´1,Ztq : U ”
´
Us,tdF
s P
p´8, 0s.
(a) Existence of joint distribution for some s : With no frictions, that is,
for λs “ 0,PYt´1a.s., a joint distribution for pYt, Yt´1, Ztq exists by con-
struction (parametric benchmark model) and thus FpYt,Yt´1,Ztq is equal to
FpYt|Yt´1,ZtqFYt´1FZt . Given additive separability of λspYt´1, Ztq, F spYt,Yt´1,Ztq
also exists as F spYt,Yt´1,Ztq “ FpYt|Yt´1,Ztqpv ´ λspYt´1, ZtqqFYt´1FZt .
(b) The set of admissible joint distributions: Since a joint distribution ex-
ists, the set of admissible structures are then determined by: Us,t “
λspYt´1, Ztq ` CZt for any constant matrix C. Under Correct specifi-
cation, U ‰ 0 iff there are frictions in the economy. This is true for
the set of admissible densities Fs,C ”
!
F spYt,Yt´1,Ztqpvq :
´
Us,tdF
s ă 0
)
Ą
Fs,λ ”
!
F spYt,Yt´1,Ztq :
´
λspYt´1, ZtqdF s ă 0
)
. But,U “ 0, @F spYt,Yt´1,Ztq P
Fs,CzFs,λ. The set of admissible U is the smallest set compatible with
λs ‰ 0 and thus ΘI is sharp.

Proof. of Proposition 5
This is a generalization of the proof in Proposition 5. We denote the moment condi-
tions using ny macroeconomic variables by q1pθ,Yt´1q and moment conditions using
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m´ ny survey variables by q2pθ,Yt´1q:
q1pθ,Yt´1q
nyˆ1
“ V1pYt´1q P rVpYtq1, V¯pYtq1s
q2pθ,Yt´1q
pny´kqˆ1
“ V2pYt´1q P rVpYtq2, V¯pYtq2s
which again imply the following unconditional moment restrictions:
EpφpZtqpq1pθ,Yt´1q ´ V1pYt´1qq “ 0
EpφpZtqpq2pθ,Yt´1q ´ V2pYt´1qq “ 0
Recall that r is the minimum number of observables such that Jpθq ” BBθΛpθq, is of
full column rank. Rewrite the moment conditions such that the first nθ rows satisfy
the rank condition. Given the total number of moment conditions used, m, the rest
of the system has m ´ nθ equations. We partition Jpθq ” pJrpθq, Jny´rpθqq and let
H be an m ˆ nθmatrix where H ” pJrˆnθpθqT , Jpny´rqˆnθpθqT ,∆dim q2ˆnθpθqT qT . Let
m ” HbφpZtq and partition m ” pmTα ,mTβ qT where mα contains the first r elements.
. Since m ą nθ, and given a general weighting matrix W , we have the following first
order condition:
EpW 12Tα mα `W
1
2T
β mβ ´ V pZtqφpZtqq “ 0
EpW 12Tα mα `W
1
2T
β mβ ´ Unθˆ1q “ 0
This is a projection of m on a lower dimensional subspace. Since W is an arbitrary
matrix, and pmα,mβq are possibly correlated, we reproject the sum onto the space
spanned by W
1
2T
α mα. Define Qα :“ W
1
2T
α mαpmTαW Tα mαq´1mTαW
1
2
α , the projection,
and QKα the orthogonal projection. Since the original sum satisfies the moment con-
dition, then the two orthogonal complements will also satisfy it: Therefore,
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Qα
´
W
1
2T
α mα `W
1
2T
β mβ ´ U
¯
“ W 12Tα mα `Qα
´
W
1
2T
β mβ ´ U
¯
“ 0
QKα
´
W
1
2T
α mα `W
1
2T
β mβ ´ U
¯
“ QKα
´
W
1
2T
β mβ ´ U
¯
“ 0
where U P rW 12Tα VpYtqα `W
1
2T
β VpYtqβ, W
1
2T
α V¯pYtqα `W
1
2T
β V¯pYtqβs b φpYtq.
As in Proposition 4, the first set of restrictions identifies a one to one mapping from
U to ΘI , and therefore θ˚pUq ” G´1pUq. Plugging this in the second set of restric-
tions eliminates dependence on mα and imposes further restrictions on the domain of
variation of U . Thus
QKα
´
W
1
2T
β mβpUq ´ U
¯
“ 0
The admissible set for U is now
!
U P p´ inf, U¯q : QKα
´
W
1
2T
β mβpUq ´ U
¯
“ 0
)
. There-
fore, Dθ P θpUq : θ R ΘIpU 1q and consequently Θ1I Ă ΘI .
The case of non-linear moment conditions: The above proof carries through if we
replace the linear projection with conditional expectations. In this case, Qα is the
conditional expectation operator, which also implies that any integrable moment func-
tion m can be decomposed as m “ Qαm`QKαm such that Qαpm´Qαmq “ 0. This is
important for the corollary regarding survey based conditions as conditional expec-
tations are no longer linear. 
Proof. of Proposition 6: Recall that agent i has the following behavioral equation
Gpθ1, θ2qxi,t “ F pθ1, θ2qEt,ipxi,t`1|Ft´1,iq ` Lpθ1, θ2qzi,t, which can be rewritten as :
Gpθ1, 0qxi,t “ F pθ1, 0qEtpxi,t`1|Ft´1q ` Lpθ1, 0qzi,t ` µi,t(32)
Before formally deriving the bounds, we need to establish some facts which will be
used in the derivations:
49
(1) µt is a continuous function of the state variables
The model with frictions reduces to the frictionless model by either by setting
θ2 “ 0 or by eliminating differences in subjective expectations from rational
expectations, Ei,tpXt|Fi,tq,EpXt|Ft,i@iq. We show that the latter is equivalent
to a change in a component of the model. Since, Pp.|Ft,iq is absolutely contin-
uous to the Rational Expectations measure Pp.|Ft,i@iq, there exists a Radon
Nikodym derivative Mt,i :“ dPi,tdPt such that Pi,tpχq “
´
χ
Mt,iPt for χ Ă X. For
Mt,i “ 1 for all t, i we get the frictionless model. Then given θ2 and Mt,i, µt
is a continuous w.r.t state variables.
(2) Any probability statement about µt translates to a probability state-
ment on λt.
Since x‹i,t solves the behavioral functional equation of the agent uniquely, there
is a map h : pG,F, Lq Ñ pP,Qq which is a continuous bijection, and by the im-
plicit function theorem, any perturbation to the first order conditions (change
in pG,F, Lq) maps to perturbations of the solution, (P,Q). Therefore, for
every univariate decision variable, Ppµi,t P rµi, µ¯isq “ Pphpλi,tq P rµi, µ¯isq “
Ppλi,t P rλi, λ¯isq. Given Proposition 1, same statement holds also for Etλi,t
and Etµi,t .
(3) Any probability statement on the subjective conditional expecta-
tions translates to a probability statement on µi,t
Recall that the enlarged state vector contains also past states, Xt ” pXt, X˜tq
where X˜t “ Xt´1. Observing Ei,tpxi,t`1q P Bl therefore implies observing ei-
ther an expectation about the future or the present. Given the behavioral
equation of the agent, Ei,tpxi,t`1q maps deterministically to xi,t and therefore
µi,t.
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Given the above, we consider the expected value of the statistic Bˆk,t. Given the (joint)
measure P “ Pptq ˆ Λpiq, taking the expectation we have that
EtBˆk,t “
ÿ
iďN
wi
ˆ ˆ
1pEi,tpxi,t`1|Ft´1,iq P BqdpP pFt|Ft´1q ˆ Λtpiqq
“
ÿ
iďN
wiP¯tpEi,tpxi,t`1|Ft´1,iq P Bq
“ P¯tpEi,tpxi,t`1|Ft´1,iq P Bq
“ P¯tpEtµi,t P rEtµi,t,Eµ¯i,tsq
“ P¯tpEtλi,t P rEtλi,t,Eλ¯i,tsq
In the second to last equality, we use fact 3 and in the last equality we have used fact
2 adapted to conditional means. We next derive the main result.
Let Y ot “ Xt, Y mt “ P pθ1, 0qXt´1. Denote by pX ‹t ,Z‹t q the time dependent subset
of the support such that λi,t ă 0, @pxi,t´1, zi,tq P pX ‹t ,Z‹t q and by pX ‹,Ct ,Z‹,Ct q their
complements in pX ,Zq. Given that λ1,2i can possibly differ across i, let24
λji,t ”
$’’&’’%
λ1xi,t´1 or λ2zi,t if pxi,t´1, zi,tq P pX ‹t ,Z‹t q
0 otherwise
(33)
Y ot “
ˆ
λ1tdΛtpiq `
ˆ
λ2tdΛtpiq `Qpθ1, 0qZt ` Y mt
“ λ1
ˆ
X ‹t
xi,t´1dΛtpiq ` λ2
ˆ
Z‹t
zi,tdΛtpiq `Qpθ1, 0qZt ` Y mt
24The typical example in this case would be economies with ex post heterogeneity i.e. across net
asset positions.
51
Pre-multiplying and post dividing every element of
´
X ‹t xi,t´1dΛtpiq and
´
Z‹t zi,tdΛtpiq with
the corresponding aggregates:
Y ot “ λ1Xt´1 d
ˆ
X ‹t
xi,t´1dΛtpiq mXt´1 ` λ2 d Zt
ˆ
Z‹t
zi,tdΛtpiq m Zt `Qpθ1, 0qZt ` Y mt(34)
where d and m are the Hadamard product and division respectively, and P is the probability
over vectors zi,t and xi,t´1 using Λi. Without loss of generality, looking at the first element
of the vector
´
X ‹t xi,t´1dΛtpiq mXt´1,
ˆ
X ‹t
x1i,t´1dΛtpiq mX1t´1
“ Epx
1
i,t´1|xi,t P X ‹t qPpxi,t P X ‹t q
Epx1i,t´1|xi,t P X ‹t qPpxi,t P X ‹t q ` Epx1i,t´1|xi,t P X ‹,Ct qPpxi,t P X ‹,Ct q
“ Ppxi,t P X
‹
t q
Ppxi,t P X ‹t q ` Ppxi,t P X ‹,Ct q `
ˆ
Epx1i,t´1|xi,tPX ‹,Ct q
Epx1i,t´1|xi,tPX ‹t q ´ 1
˙
Ppxi,t P X ‹,Ct q
:“ Ppxi,t P X
‹
t q
1` Rˆ1t
Bt
1` Rˆ1t
ď Bt
1` infX ‹t Rˆ1t
“ Bt
The last inequality holds since infX ‹t Rˆ
1
t “ 0, supX ‹t Rˆ1t “ 8 and by the monotonicity as-
sumption (S´ 4). The inequality holds for every element of xi,t. Finally, taking conditional
expectations of (34) (using Pp.|Xt´1q:
EpY ot |Xt´1q ď λ1Xt´1 d EpBt|Xt´1q ` Y mt

Proof. of Corollary 7
(1): When Bt “ 0, Ppxi,t P X ‹t q “ 0 and therefore the model has no frictions, which trivially
restores point identification. When Bt “ 1,
´
X ‹t x
1
i,t´1dΛtpiq “ Xt´1, and this results to the
first type of moment inequality using macroeconomic data. We now show the possibility of
refinement of Θ for B P p0, 1q. Defining the conditional errors from the first and second types
of inequalities as νt ” Y ot ´P pθ1, 0qXt´1 and ηt ” Yˆ ot ´P pθ1, 0qXt´1´λ1Xt´1dEpBt|Xt´1q
respectively, Epηt|νt,Yq “
´
ηtppηt|νt,Yq ‰ ηt since ppηt|νt,Yq ‰ 1 and ηt´Epηt|νt,Yq ‰ 0
unless Bt “ 0.
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(2): Suppose that ΘI is a singleton. This implies that B “ 0, or Λtpiq has unit mass on one
agent which is unconstrained, and thus B “ 0 too. 
Proof. of Proposition 8
Consider the quantity T´ 12 infθPΘˆs ||V´
1
2 pfˆpθˆpq ´ fˆpθˆsqq||. Given that Θ is a con-
nected set and Θˆs P Θ, then Θˆs is also connected. For any θ, θ1 P clpΘˆsq, dpθ, θ1q ă
 for arbitrarily small  ą 0. This implies that if θp P Θs then there exists a
θs P Θˆs such that ||V´ 12 pfpθpq ´ fpθsqq|| ă . For every estimating equation, re-
define fˆpθˆpq “ T´1 řt qpY ; θq ´ T´1 řt EqpY ; θq ` γT “ AT pθq ` γT where AT pθq ”
pAT,1pθq, AT,2pθq, ...At,ppθqqT and γT “ pγ1,T , γ2,T , ...γp,T , qT . By element-wise mean
value expansion around θl P Θl, l P s, p, fˆpθˆq “ EqpYt, θlq ` pfˆpθlq ´ EqpYt, θlqq `
Dpθ˜qpθ ´ θlqq. Given mild assumptions on the p2` δq boundedness of each moment,
the second component scaled by
?
T ,
?
T pfˆpθlq ´ Efˆpθlqq Ñd N p0,Ω1,lq while the
scaled third component, Dpθ˜q?T pθ ´ θlqq Ñd N p0,Ω2,lq. Consequently, for each
j, j ď p, AT,j Ñd N p0,Ωj˚ q. Let Vpθq “ AsyV arpT 12fpθpq ´ T 12fpθsqq and denote by
Vdpθq be the matrix containing only the diagonal elements of Vpθq.
T
1
2V´
1
2
d pfˆpθˆpq ´ fˆpθˆsqq “ V´
1
2
d T
1
2 pAT pθpq ´ AT pθsq ` γT,p ´ γT,sq
Under H0, θp P Θs, or fpθpq P fpΘsq and thus infθPΘspγT,p ´ γT,sq “ 0
TWpθp,Θsq “ inf
fpθsqPfpΘˆsq
||Vˆd´
1
2 pT 12AT pθpq ´ T 12AT pθsq ` T 12 pγT,p ´ γT,sqq||2
“ inf
θsPΘˆs
||Vˆd´
1
2 pT 12AT pθpq ´ T 12AT pθsq ` T 12 pγT,p ´ γT,sqq||2
dÑ ||V´ 12d V
1
2N p0, Ipq||2
Under H1, θp ‰ Θs, and therefore inf
θsPΘs
pγT,p ´ γT,sq “ Op1q.
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TWpθp,Θsq “ inf
fpθsqPfpΘˆsq
||Vˆ´ 12T 12 pAT pθpq ´ AT pθsq ` γT,p ´ γT,sq||2
“ ||Vˆ´ 12 pT 12AT pθpq ´ T 12AT pθsq ` inf
fpθsqPfpΘˆsq
T
1
2 pγT,p ´ γT,sq||2
“ ||Opp1q `OppT 12 q||2 “ OppT q

Proof. of µols R µID,2 in Partial Equilibrium
We first solve for the consumption process. Let pt :“ Ptpλi,t ą 0q and p :“ Epc
2
i,tPtpλi,tą0qq
Ec2i,t
.
Moreover, let βp1 ` rq and ρ Ñ 8, βp1 ` rq 1ρ “ 1 and therefore µ˜0 “ 0. Denote by
ϕpuq the Normal density at u and by sp.q the marginal density of ci,t, Assuming that
ci,t started τ periods ago,
ci,t`1 “
τÿ
j“0
t`1´jp1` χi,t´jλ2qΠj´1k“0p1` χi,t´kλ1q :“
τÿ
j“0
t`1´jzt`1´j :“
τÿ
j“0
ξt`1´j
where Ppzt`1´j “ 0q “ 0. Consumption is a convolution of τ`1 independent variables
ξt`1´j whose marginal density is a mixture of Np0, ωpλ1, λ2, jqq with weights that
depend on p and j. For example, ξt`1´j “ t`1´jp1` λ2qΠj´1k“0p1` λ1q w.p.p1´ pqj`1.
For each ξt`1´j, symmetry around zero is maintained. Next, we prove the result for
τ “ 1. Evaluating the LHS of (7) at the true µ˜0 and the RHS at µols, setting u “ 0
and taking their difference,
∆ :“ `12 ´ Φ0,σ2 p´pµ˜olsci,tqq˘p1´ ptq ` pΦ0,σ2 p1`λ2q2p´pµ˜` λ1qci,tq ´ Φ0,σ2olsp´µ˜olsci,tqqpt
For µols to be admissible, ∆ should be weakly positive for all pt such that
pΦ0,σ2 p1`λ2q2p´pµ˜`λ1qci,tq´Φ0,σ2olsp´µ˜olsci,tqq ě 0. Sufficient conditions for the latter,
are σ2ols “ σ2 p1` λ2q2, which is true for all pλ1, λ2q : λ2` 2λ2´ λ1 σ
2
c
σ2
pp1´ pq “ 0, and
for probability functions Bt : λ1ci,tp1´ pq ě 0. We choose Bt “ 1pci,t ă 0q.
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Substituting for the test point µ˜ “ µols and Bt “ 1pci,t ă 0q, ∆ ą 0 for ci,t ą 0 by
construction, while for ci,t ă 0 we have a contradiction:
∆ “ 12 ´ Φ0,σ2 p´pλ1ci,tq “
1
2 ´ Φ0,σ2 ppλ1|ci,t|q ă 0(35)

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10.0.1. Small Open Economy model for Spain. In what follows variables with ˚ denote
the "rest of the world", yt is real output, ct is consumption, it investment, qt the value
of capital, kt is productive capital, kst capital services, zt is capital utilization, µ
p
t is
the price markup, pit is domestic inflation, picpi is CPI inflation, rkt is the rental rate
of capital, wt is the real wage and rt is the interest rate
yt “ cyct ` iyit ` zyzt ` nxyst ` gt
ct “ c1Etct`1 ` c2plt ´ Elt`1q ´ c3prt ´ Etpit`1 ` btq
Etrkt`1 “ r1prt ´ Etpit`1 ` btq
yt “ φppαkst ` p1´ αqlt ` αt q
ct “ ct˚ ` 1σa st
kst “ kt´1 ` zt
zt “ z1rkt
kt “ k1kt´1 ` p1´ k1qit
µpt “ αpkst ´ ltq ` αt ´ wt
pit “ pi1pit´1 ` pi2Etpit`1 ´ pt
picpi “ pit ` ν∆st
rkt “ ´pkt ´ ltq ` wt
µwt “ wt ´ σllt ` ct
wt “ w1wt´1 ` p1´ w1qpEtwt`1 ` Epit`1q ´ w2pit ` w3pit´1 ´ w4µwt ` wt
rt “ ρrt´1 ` p1´ ρqrrpipicpi,t ` rypyt ´ ypt qs ` r∆Y rpyt ´ ypt q ´ pyt´1 ´ ypt´1qs ` rt
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Financial Frictions and Capital adjustment costs imply the following changes to the
model, where Qt is the price of capital and Rkt the return to capital :
EtRkt`1 “ ´χprpNt ´Qt ´ ktq ` rt ´ Etpit`1
Nt “ γr¯k
ˆˆ
K¯
N¯
˙`
Rkt ´ rt´1
˘` rkt `Nt´1˙
it “ i1it´1 ` p1´ i1qEtit`1 ` 1
φadj
Qt ` q,t
Qt “ q1EtQt`1 ` p1´ q1qEtrkt`1 ´ pRkt ` b,tq
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Table 1. Confidence Set for ΘIM and ΘCM -with survey data
Incomplete Model Complete Model
Parameter q2.5% q97.5% q5% q95%
σc 12.460 13.320 28.6900 30.0000
φp 5.1840 5.3430 21.5700 21.7000
gy 0.9668 1.0000 0.2432 0.4827
λh 0.7550 0.7673 0.0009 0.0009
σl 8.5140 8.5760 8.892 9.104
ξp 0.3654 0.3846 0.0000 0.0000
ξw 0.0945 0.0958 0.8173 0.8628
ιw 0.5631 0.575 0.9748 0.9999
ιp 0.4952 0.498 0.0004 0.0004
z1 0.5360 0.5429 0.0009 0.0009
ρa 0.6447 0.6504 0.7521 0.9092
ρb 0.6729 0.6789 0.0000 0.0000
ρg 0.0000 0.0023 0.9999 0.9999
ρqs 0.3394 0.3468 0.3242 0.4079
ρms 0.4044 0.4137 0.7347 0.8015
ρp 0.4802 0.4843 0.6329 0.7077
ρw 0.2690 0.2719 0.0003 0.0003
map 0.9958 1.000 0.0129 0.0561
maw 0.5466 0.5487 0.0010 0.0011
ν 0.6084 0.6104 0.0053 0.0205
ρy‹ 0.6080 0.6080 0.1683 0.2251
σa 9.8980 20.000 0.0245 0.0339
σb 3.8910 7.3910 3.4480 3.4800
σg 13.530 13.830 4.5820 4.6340
σqs 9.2380 15.23 0.1831 0.2064
σm 9.1220 10.240 1.0250 1.0670
σp 0.9563 1.9220 4.2260 4.2660
σw - - - -
σf - - - -
φadj - - 5.9210 5.9550
χpr - - 0.9862 0.9999
γ - - 0.9944 0.9950
K{N - - 4.3330 4.3490
Note: σw and σf are set to 1. Parameters in italic font reached the boundary and
thus calibrated to the boundary value.
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Estimated Wedges - with Survey Data- 5% level
Figure 1. Full Sample Wedges (due to Financial Frictions and Capital
Adjustment Costs)
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Figure 2. Full Sample Wedges (due to Financial Frictions and Capital
Adjustment Costs)
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Figure 3. Full Sample Wedges (due to Financial Frictions and Capital
Adjustment Costs)
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Figure 4. Full Sample Wedges (due to Financial Frictions and Capital
Adjustment Costs)
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Appendix B: Supplemental Material
11. Towards General Equilibrium - More examples
9. Capital Adjustment Costs
Assuming full depreciation, the capital accumulation equation of the representative
firm is distorted as follows: Kt`1 “ It ´ φ2 pKt`1Kt ´ 1q2Kt for φ P p0, 1q.
Using the capital accumulation equation in the linearised Euler equation and imposing
R˜t “ Z˜t ´ p1´ αqK˜t we have:
pω ` φp1` βp1´ αqq ` 1´ αqκt “ pα ´ φp1´ βαqqpα ´ 1qK˜t ` pω ` βφqκt`1 ´ φZ˜t
“ pα ´ φp1´ βαqqR˜t ` pω ` βφqEtκt`1 ` ...
...´ αp1´ βφqZ˜t
where κt is the Lagrange multiplier on the capital accumulation equation. Assuming
that productivity is iid, and iterating forward we get:
κt “ γ11´ γ2L´1EtR˜t ` γ3Z˜t “ ζpL, γ1, γ2qEtR˜t ` γ3Z˜t
where γ1 ” α´φp1´βαqω`φp1`βp1´αqq`1´α , γ2 “ ω`βφω`φp1`βp1´αqq`1´α and γ3 “ ´αp1´βφqω`φp1`βp1´αqq`1´α and
L the lag operator. Using κt “ ´ωC˜t, and letting s :“ CssIss , aggregate investment is:
I˜con,t “ p1` sqY˜t ` s
ω
ζpL, γ1, γ2qEtR˜t ` s
ω
γ3Z˜t
When φ “ 0,
(36) I˜‹t “ p1` sqY˜t ` sωζpL, γ1,φ“0, γ2,φ“0qEtR˜t `
s
ω
γ3,φ“0Z˜t
Notice that ζpL, γ1, γ2q is increasing in both γ1 and γ2 and dγ1dφ ă 0, dγ2dφ ă 0 for ω ą 1
and dγ3
dφ
ą 0. Therefore, ζpL, γ1,φ“0, γ2,φ“0q ´ ζpL, γ1, γ2q ą 0, @φ and the difference
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the investment rules with and without adjustment costs is:
λ˜t ” I˜con,t ´ I˜‹t
“ s
ω
pζpL, γ1,φ“0, γ2,φ“0q ´ ζpL, γ1, γ2qqEtR˜t ` s
ω
pγ3,φ“0 ´ γ3qZ˜t
“ ´ s
ω
pζpL, γ1,φ“0, γ2,φ“0q ´ ζpL, γ1, γ2qqp1´ αqK˜t...
...` s
ω
pζpL, γ1,φ“0, γ2,φ“0q ´ ζpL, γ1, γ2q ` pγ3,φ“0 ´ γ3qqZ˜t
Hence, λ˜t is negatively related to K˜t. Moreover, after some algebra it can be shown
that the coefficient of Z˜t is also bounded below by a positive number if α ă 12β .
Nevertheless, the sign of the conditional mean of λ˜t is determined and the following
moment inequality holds: Eλ˜tK˜t´j ď 0, @j ě 0.
10. Occasionally binding constraints
The case of occasionally binding constraints can be best motivated by attaching an
aggregate marginal efficiency shock, t to investment, that is, ki,t “ p1´δqki,t´1`tii,t.
For simplicity we assume that this shock is iid and takes two values, H and L. We
analyse the case of constraints on dis-investing (capital irreversibility), which can be
thought of as a restriction on how much capital households can withdraw from the
firm every period. The optimization problem now includes a new constraint of the
form Kt ě ρp1´ δqKt´1 which is equivalent to It ě ´ ρ˜tKt where ρ˜ ” p1´ ρqp1´ δq.
Denoting by νt the Lagrange multiplier on this constraint, and κt the Lagrange mul-
tiplier on the law of motion of capital, the relevant optimality conditions are:
κt ` βEκt`1pρ˜´ p1´ δqq ` EC´ωt`1pRt`1 ` ρ˜t`1 q “ 0
νt ´ κtt ´ C´ωt “ 0
νtpIt ` ρ˜
t
Ktq “ 0
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When t “ H the representative household will choose I‹H,t according to the following
Euler equation, which we get by setting νt “ 0:
C´ωt “ EβC´ωt`1 H,tt`1 p1´ δ `Rt`1t`1q
and linearizing we have:
´ωC˜t “ ´EC˜t`1 ` ˜H,t ` ER˜t`1
Solving the Euler equation forward, we get I˜‹H,t “ I˜‹t ` ˜H,t. When t “ L,t, the
household dis-invests up to the irreversibility level, that is IL,t “ ´ ρ˜tKt. The corre-
sponding linearized rule is I˜L,t “ ´pK˜t ´ ˜tq where we have imposed that Et “ 1.
Therefore aggregate investment evolves as:
I˜con,t “ I˜‹H,tPpt “ Hq ` IL,tPpt “ Lq
“ I˜‹t ´ p1´ Ppt “ HqqpI˜‹H,t ´ I˜L,tq
and the distortion produced by the occasionally binding constraint is:
λ˜t “ I˜con,t ´ I˜‹t “ ´p1´ Ppt “ HqqpI˜‹t ` K˜t ´ ˜L ` ˜Hq
Here λ˜t is negative as by definition ˜H ą ˜L. The moment inequality implied by this
friction is Eλ˜tK˜t´j ď 0, @j ě 0.
11. Non Rational Expectations
When agents employ different models to make predictions, have misperceptions or
sentiments, the sign of Eλ˜tK˜i,t´j depends on how the model used by the agent relates
to the objective probability measure. Suppose, for illustration, that agents are un-
aware and unable to estimate the stochastic process for productivity. Suppose that
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the true process is Z˜t “ εt where εt „ Np0, 1q. Agents use output realizations to pre-
dict future productivity, EtZ˜t`j “ ρjY˜t for |ρ| ă 1, since CorrpZt, Ytq “ 11`α2VpKtq ą 0.
Using this conditional expectation in the investment rule 2.1, aggregate investment
is:
I˜con,t “ A1pθqK˜t ` A2pθqp1´ A3pθqρq´1pαK˜t ` Z˜tq
while the investment rule used by the econometrician after substituting the true
process for Z˜t in (10) is:
(37) I˜t “ A1pθqK˜t ` A2pθqZ˜t
The difference between the investment rule under bounded rationality and the one
used by the econometrician is therefore:
λ˜t “ A2pθqp1´ A3pθqρq´1pαK˜t ` ρA3pθq Z˜tq
Assuming full capital depreciation and using the true process for productivity in
equation (37), which is identical to equation (36) once we substitute for the production
function and the return to capital, we get that A2pθq “ 1 ` CssIss ą 0 and A3pθq “
sα
p1`sqpω`1´αq ă 1. Therefore, λ˜t is a positive function of K˜t and Z˜t, and the moment
inequality in this case is, Eλ˜tKt´j ě 0, @j ě 0.
12. Perturbing the frictionless model
12.1. Obtaining unique conditional models. For every θ P Θ, there is a multi-
plicity of corresponding conditional models which can be constructed with different
distributions of shocks but give rise to the same Eλt.
To construct this family of models, we use the fact that the process λt causes a
change in the measure implied by the frictionless model. As Hansen (2013), we define
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a perturbation Mt such that for any measurable random variable Wt: EtMWt “
EtpWt|Mf q (and vice versa, that is EtWt “ Etp ˜˜MtWt|Mf q ). This representation is
useful for two reasons. First, as we show in the proof of Proposition 6, interpreting
the distortions as a change of measure provides a unified way of looking at frictions.
Second, we can compute Mt, for all t, and this can give us estimates of the wedges
at any point of time.
We briefly explain how one can compute Mt - a full description is in the Appendix.
Recall that in the linearised model, λ˜t measures the distance between the prediction
of the frictionless model and the data, where the latter is assumed to be produced
by a model with frictions. As shown in section 2, λ˜t is a function of the endogenous
variables and the shocks. Without loss of generality assume that Eλ˜t ą 0. We look
for a Mt that makes this expectation zero. By finding a Mt such that EMtλ˜t “ 0
we are identifyingMtdPp.q, which is the density of the frictionless model that can be
derived from the data by distorting the objective distribution, P. Given Mt, we can
decompose Eλ˜t as: Eλ˜t ” EMtλ˜t`Ep1´Mtqλ˜t. Therefore, to impose EMtλ˜t “ 0 it
suffices to set Ep1´Mtqλ˜t “ Eλ˜t. The term 1´Mt determines the distortion at time
t. To understand why using this decomposition is useful, notice that λ˜t is related to
endogenous frictions but also to the unobservable shocks. As we show below, 1´Mt
is a time varying function of Eλ˜t. Since the latter is an average, unobservable shocks
are eliminated and 1´Mt captures only the endogenous frictions.
In general, Mt is a positive Ft´ measurable random variable, unit expectation mar-
tingale, EpMt`1|Ftq “Mt, EMt “ 1. Being a martingale is a necessary condition for
the distorted conditional expectation to be consistent with the Kolmogorov definition
(Hansen and Sargent, 2005). We stack allMt in a vectorM and define M˜ “ 1´M
where 1 is the unit vector, which corresponds to the frictionless steady state of Mt.
The vector M satisfies the following program, where bold letters indicate vectors,
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λ˜pYt; θq is the matrix containing the distortions for every t for every variable j, λ˜j,t
and ppi1, pi2, pi3q are the corresponding Lagrange multiplier vectors. Moreover, there
are multipleMt that satisfy the restriction Ep1´Mtqλ˜t “ Eλ˜t. This is exactly what
we mean by a multiplicity of conditional models. In order to get a unique conditional
model, we need to impose more restrictions on the stochastic behavior of Mt and
therefore λ˜t.
To do this, we introduce a pseudo-distance metric dpMtq, which we minimize subject
to the restriction EpMt ´ 1qλ˜t “ Eλ˜t. The choice of the metric depends on the
modellers’ beliefs of the distribution of the shocks.
We first state the optimization problem for a general distance dpM˜q
max
M
´dpM˜q
subject to 1TM˜ “ 0 pλ1q
M˜TqjpY ; θq ` 1TqjpY ; θq “ 0, j “ 1, ..p , pλ2,jq
M˜TqjpY ; θq `
“
1TqjpY ; θq
‰
` “ 0, j “ p` 1, ..r
M ě0 pλ3,t,@t P p1..T q
where qpY ; θq is the matrix containing the moment functions and pλ1, λ2, λ3q the cor-
responding Lagrange multiplier vectors. The first constraint imposes unit expectation
while the last constraint imposes non negativity ofM. The rest of the constraints im-
pose the moment equalities and inequalities e.g. rxs` ” maxpx, 0q Denote by d˜pMtq
as the inverse function of dpMtq. The Kuhn Tucker first order necessary conditions
are the following
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M˚ “ qpY; θqλ2 ` λ1 ` λ3
d˜pqpY; θqλ2 ` λ1 ` λ3qTqpY; θq ` 1TqpY; θq “ 0, pλ2q
1T d˜pqpY; θqλ2 ` λ1 ` λ3q “ 0, pλ1q
λ3,t ě 0
λ3,tpd˜pqtpY, θqλ2 ` λ1 ` λ3,tqq “ 0, pλ3,tq
Below we illustrate what happens when dpMtq ” 12pM ´ 1qT pM ´ 1q (chi square
distance) which is consistent with the shocks having finite second moments
25. Note that this distance metric is also used in the classic mean-variance frontiers
in portfolio choice theory, or to compute Hansen-Jagganathan bounds. Intuitively,
the minimization implies that we look for Mt that is consistent with our moment
restrictions and has minimum variance 26. Restricting the distribution of the shocks
pins down a unique conditional model corresponding to a value of θ.
Ignoring the non - negativity constraint we get an analytical solution. Solving the
dual problem and concentrating out the first constraint leads to solutions pM˚, λ2˚q
that satisfy the following system:
»——– IT ´pqpY ; θq ´ q¯pY ; θqqTˆr
qpY ; θqT
rˆT
0
rˆr
fiffiffifl
»—– M˜Tˆ1
λ2
rˆ1
fiffifl “
»——————–
0
Tˆ1
´1Tq1pY ; θq
pˆ1
´ “1Tq2pY ; θq‰`
pr´pqˆ1
fiffiffiffiffiffiffifl
25 For any random variable x and distorting density Mt by Cauchy Schwartz we have that
p´ xtMtdPq2 ď ´ x2tdP ´ M2tdP. Minimizing the variance of the second term assumes that the
variance of the first term exists.
26This is similar to the approach in generalized empirical likelihood settings in econometrics (i.e.
Newey and Smith (2004)).
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We therefore have that for q˜pY ; θq ” qpY ; θq´q¯pY ; θq and VpqpYt; θqq ” T´1q˜pY ; θqTqpY ; θq
»—– M˜
λ2
rˆ1
fiffifl “
»———————–
q˜pY ; θqVpqpY ; θqq´1
»– q¯1pY ; θq
rq¯2pY ; θqs`
fifl
´VpqpY ; θqq´1
»– q¯1pY ; θq
rq¯2pY ; θqs`
fifl
fiffiffiffiffiffiffiffifl
Therefore,
M˜ “ wt
»– 0
rq¯2pY ; θqs`
fifl(38)
where wt ” Zˆ2t`λˆtpλˆt´EλˆtqVpZˆtq`Vpλˆtqq . The optimal Mt is a time varying function wt of the
average distortion over the sample, q¯2pY ; θq. The weight wt is a function of the
relative variability of λˆ, which is a function of the endogenous variables, and of Zˆt,
which is function of the shocks Zt.
The solution above has been derived ignoring the non negativity constraint. Looking
at M˜t the constraint is violated with positive probability, since q˜pY ; θq can take values
lower than minus one. Taking into account the non-negativity constraint implies a
non analytical solution. There is a variety of algorithms in quadratic optimization to
deal with this issue. An alternative way is to use a penalty function that penalizes
negative values of Mt. This also typically implies non-closed form solutions. For
the adjustment cost example, we re-computed the estimated Mt and we report it in
Appendix B. As is evident, violations of the constraint can be minimal. The existence
of a unique function M˜ ˚ pθq implies that the set of models consistent with moment
inequalities should have a corresponding one-to-one relation to the identified set, the
subset of Θ that satisfies those inequalities: θ P Θ : Eq1pY, θq “ 0,Eq2pY, θq ě 0.
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This is made clear in Figure 9.1, which depicts two theory-based moment inequality
restrictions on the Euclidean parameter space. The darker area is the identified
set, and for the sake of illustration, the point of intersection of the two lines is the
combination pθ1, θ2q that corresponds to the pseudo-true parameter values of the case
of no perturbation pMt “ 1q. The identified set contains the true value, which maps
one-to-one to the set of admissible perturbations M˜2.
Moreover, choices of objective functional other than 1
T
ř
tďT M˜2t leads to different
sorts of distortions. A general family of distances that can account for non-linearities
or non-normalities is the Cressie - Read divergence, of which Chi square is a special
case (Almeida and Garcia (2014); Cressie and Read (1984)). As in the case of non-
negative constraints, computing the multipliers might involve numerical optimization.
It is also important to stress that for any choice of distance functional, the moment
inequality constraints are satisfied. Therefore, the choice of distance functional does
not affect the consistency of the parameter estimates.
13. Identification and Estimation
12. Identification in the case of capital adjustment costs
We assume that the representative firm faces adjustment costs with iid probability
Bt which is a random variable with mean B. As long as B is positive, the con-
ditional mean of λ˜t is the same as the one derived in example 1. We focus on
identification using the aggregate capital accumulation equation. Denote the solu-
tion of the frictionless model as: Kt “ ϕkpθqKt´1 ` ϕzpθqZt. Therefore, Et´1Kt “
ϕkpθqKt´1. Let ζt denote an instrument and pζ,K,K´1, Bq the vectors containing
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data on pζt, Kt, Kt´1, Btq. The two identifying conditions are:
EζT pK ´ ϕkpθqK´1q “ v1(39)
EζT pK ´ ϕkpθqK´1 ` |λ1|K´1 d Bq “ v2(40)
where v1 ď 0, v2 ď 0. Rearranging the first equation and letting ϕˆk ” EpζTK´1q´1EζTK,
we get a lower bound for ϕkpθq:
ϕkpθq “ ϕˆk ´ EpζTK´1q´1v1 ě ϕˆk
Similarly, from the second equation, Letting:
ϕˆs ” |λ1|EpζTK´1q´1EpζT pK´1 d Bˆqq, we have:
(41) ϕkpθq “ ϕˆk ` ϕˆs ´ EpζTK´1q´1v2 ě ϕˆk ` ϕˆs
Clearly, as long as B P p0, 1q, (41) is more informative, for any λ1.
13.1. Using Bootstrap to do Model Validation. To get a better approximation
to the finite sample distribution of the test statistic, we propose the use of a suitable
version of bootstrap. Given a bootstrap sample tY ˚t,lutďT,lďB obtained with a block
bootstrap scheme we can compute the wedges to each equation, using the plug-in
estimate of θ under the survey-robust case and the full model. We consider the re-
centered bootstrapped moments, pf˜1pY ˚; θq, f˜2pY ˚; θq..f˜kpY ˚; θqq where f˜jpY ˚; θq ”
fjpY ˚; θq´ f¯jpY ˚; θq. We choose to recenter the moments since we deal with an over-
identified case, and therefore sample moments, q¯pY ; θq, are not exactly equal to zero.
We obtain critical values by computing the p1´ αq´quantile of TW ˚ pθp,Θsq. That
is, cα is chosen such that PT pTW ˚ pθp,Θsq ă cαq “ 1 ´ α. We therefore have that,
given the uniform consistency of the bootstrap :
(1) Under H0 : p lim
T,BÑ8
PT pTW ˚pθp,Θsq ă cα|Yt,tďT q “ PpTWpθp,Θsq ă cαq “ 1´α
72
(2) Under H1 : p lim
T,BÑ8
PT pTW ˚ pθp,Θsq ă cα|Yt,tďT q “ PpTW ˚ pθp,Θsq ă cαq “ 0
We illustrate below an example with which we show how the bootstrap behaves in
large samples. Small sample distortions is an interesting topic to pursue, but is the
subject af another paper. We use a regression based example, which is unrelated to
survey data as such, but has the same econometric structure.
13. Measurement error in Regressors Suppose there one independent measure-
ment of a regressor and the model for the measurement error is X1,t “ Xt˚ ` ν1,t.
Furthermore assume that ν1,t „ N p0, 0.22q and t „ N p0, 0.1q. The important as-
sumption in this case is that she "knows" all parameters apart from β and that she
mistakenly assumes that σν1,t “ 0.5. She uses Simulated Maximum likelihood to es-
timate βm where Yt “ 0.2`βXt`t. A robust approach would be to be agnostic about
the distribution of the errors and use the well known fact that B0 “ tβ P B : βols ď βu.
We can in principle use also the reverse regression to derive an upper bound but it is
not necessary for our purposes. We therefore test H0 : βm P B0.
To see the equivalence of this test to the test we propose, notice that under the Null
T´
1
2 infβ0PB0pXT pY ´βˆ0Xq´XT pY ´βˆmXq is equal to T´ 12XTXpβˆm´βm´pβˆ0˚´β0˚ qq.
The residual in this case,
ř
t q˜2p.q is equal to pXTXT q´1XT `β0X
TX˚
XTX
` X˜T X˜
T
q´1X˜T `
β0
X˜TX˚
X˜T X˜
. We plot below the bootstrap distribution versus the simulated test statistic,
which in this case according to our theoretical result is, for λx1,x2 ” σ
2
x1
σ2x2
, TW „
pβ2pp1´ λx,x˚qpλx,x˚ ´ 2λx,x˜q ` λx,x˜p1´ λx,x˜qq ` λ,xpλx,x˚ ´ λx,x˜qχ2p1q
73
Figure 5. Q-Q plot of Bootstrap versus Asymptotic distribution of W ˚
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13.2. Spanish Survey Data. Below, we plot the aggregate response to production con-
straints due to financial issues in the industrial sector.
Figure 6
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Table 2. Confidence Set for ΘIM and ΘCM - without survey data
Incomplete Model Complete Model
Parameter q2.5% q97.5% q5% q95%
σc 2.1350 2.3280 28.6900 30.0000
φp 6.4240 6.7350 21.5700 21.7000
gy 0.3112 0.4583 0.2432 0.4827
λh 0.6327 0.6674 0.0009 0.0009
σl 0.0000 0.0461 8.892 9.104
ξp 0.9913 0.9999 0.0000 0.0000
ξw 0.9504 0.9883 0.8173 0.8628
ιw 0.0000 0.0000 0.9748 0.9999
ιp 0.9949 0.9999 0.0004 0.0004
z1 0.7953 0.8228 0.0009 0.0009
ρa 0.3973 0.4602 0.7521 0.9092
ρb 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
ρg 0.2649 0.3728 0.9999 0.9999
ρqs 0.0000 0.05588 0.3242 0.4079
ρms 0.0567 0.2612 0.7347 0.8015
ρp 0.5991 0.6485 0.6329 0.7077
ρw 0.0000 0.1314 0.0003 0.0003
map 0.9753 0.9999 0.0129 0.0561
maw 0.4935 0.4935 0.0010 0.0011
ν 0.8040 0.8190 0.0053 0.0205
ρy‹ 0.4162 0.5462 0.1683 0.2251
σa 8.8820 8.9960 0.0245 0.0339
σb 0.0952 0.1342 3.4480 3.4800
σg 19.930 19.999 4.5820 4.6340
σqs 7.0010 7.1120 0.1831 0.2064
σm 0.4271 0.4933 1.0250 1.0670
σp 0.0730 0.1555 4.2260 4.2660
σw - - - -
σf - - - -
φadj - - 5.9210 5.9550
χpr - - 0.9862 0.9999
γ - - 0.9944 0.9950
K{N - - 4.3330 4.3490
Note: σw and σf are set to 1. Parameters in italic font reached the boundary and thus
calibrated to the boundary value.
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Estimated Wedges-No survey data- 5% level
Figure 7. Full Sample Wedges (due to Financial Frictions and Capital
Adjustment Costs)
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Figure 8. Full Sample Wedges (due to Financial Frictions and Capital
Adjustment Costs)
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Figure 9. Full Sample Wedges (due to Financial Frictions and Capital
Adjustment Costs)
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Figure 10. Full Sample Wedges (due to Financial Frictions and Cap-
ital Adjustment Costs)
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